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RECONSTITUTING THE FEDERALISM BATTLE
IN ENERGY TRANSPORTATION
Alexandra B. Klass* &J
im Rossi"'

-

This Article explores the growingfederalism tensions arisingfrom efforts to expand the
nation's energy transportation infrastructure-the electric transmission lines, natural gas
pipelines, naturalgas import and export terminals, and relatedfacilities that power the nation. It examines two controversial energy transportprojects for the purpose of evaluating
current barriers to more comprehensive energy infrastructureplanning and implementation.
The firstproject is the Plains & Eastern Clean Line-an interstate electric transmission line
project designed to transport wind energy resources across several south-central states. The
second project is the Constitution Pipeline-a naturalgas pipeline designed to transportnew
naturalgas resourcesfrom the Marcellus Shale region of Pennsylvania to New York. The
federal-state tensions associated with these projects highlight how a fixation on establishing
clearjurisdictionallines between federal and state authority in energy infrastructureapproval
processes has failed to provide an adequateframework for addressing today's energy needs.
These projects also show that these federalism battles manfrest themselves in similar ways
regardless of whether the states are the primary decision-makers-as is the case with interstate
electric transmission lines-or whetherfederal agencies are the primary decision-makers-as is
the case with interstate naturalgas pipelines.
Drawingfrom these illustrations, we evaluate how reforms to the governmental approvalprocessesfor energy transportprojects can result in more efficient decision-makingthat
can lead to more rapid integration of diverse energy resources and implementation of new
energy technologies. We conclude that federal regulators-historicallymuch more attuned to
federal and nationalenergy needs in making project approvaldecisions-canbenefit substantially from taking a more proactive approach towards state interests and concerns associated
with multistate energy transportprojects in cases where federal authoritypreempts state authority. Such reforms can in turn prompt state regulatorsto articulatestate and local land use
and environmental concerns in the early stages of the project review process, better ensuring
that these impacts are morefully vetted and addressedprior tofederal approvals. Moreover, a
more proactive approach by regulators andproject proposers can help to difuse interest group
behavior that tends to limit the ability of regulators to fully consider regional and national
needs as well as environmental concerns in energy transportation approval, regardless of
whether the primary decision-maker is a state or a federal agency.
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INTRODUCTION

In March 2016, the U.S. Department of Energy ("DOE") agreed to partner with a private, merchant electric transmission line company, Clean Line
Energy Partners,' to construct a high-voltage, direct current electric transmission line. 2 DOE's decision was based on section 1222 of the Energy Policy Act
of 2005 ("EPAct 2005"), a previously unused provision of law that may grant
the federal government the authority to approve an interstate electric transmission line, even over the objection of a state regulator.' For years, sponsors of the
Plains & Eastern Clean Line, which would transport wind power more than
700 miles from western Oklahoma to the Arkansas-Tennessee border, had
been unable to obtain all the required approvals for the project from state regulators, primarily because Arkansas regulators had determined that Clean Line
Energy Partners was not a traditional public utility and thus was not able to
1.

See About Clean Line Energy, CLEAN LINE ENERGY PARTNERS, https://perma.cc/5ABU5HMV; Projects, CLEAN LINE ENERGY PARTNERS, https://perma.cc/VB6V-47GU.

2.

Plains & Eastern Clean Line Transmission Line, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, https://perma.cc/
FX37-G96M; Plains & Eastern Clean Line, CLEAN LINE ENERGY PARTNERS, https://per

ma.cc/4RPS-BALL.
3.

See Plains & Eastern Clean Line Transmission Line, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 2.
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establish sufficient in-state "need" for the line. Interstate electric transmission
line projects, like the Plains & Eastern Clean Line, are difficult to build because
state law rather than federal law controls the approval process, subject to a few,
narrow exceptions that Congress created in 2005.4 As a result, any project developer proposing a multistate electric transmission line must obtain approvals
from two or more state regulators rather than from a single federal regulator. By
granting Clean Line's application to partner with DOE, the agency used its
federal authority in section 1222 to override those barriers presented by this
multistate project, allowing Clean Line to work with DOE to build the line
despite a state holdout.
In April 2016, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation denied Water Quality Certification under section 401 of the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") for the Constitution Pipeline, a 125-mile interstate natural gas pipeline proposed by energy infrastructure giant Williams Partners,s to
transport natural gas from resource-rich areas of Pennsylvania through New
York State.' This denial is notable because the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC") had already granted a certificate of public convenience
and necessity for the pipeline under the Natural Gas Act of 1938.1 In the
1930s, Congress transferred all siting' and eminent domain authority for interstate natural gas pipelines from the states to FERC's predecessor, the Federal
Power Commission ("FPC").9 Thus, unlike the approval process for interstate
electric transmission lines, the congressionally adopted framework for interstate
natural gas pipeline siting and eminent domain leaves limited opportunity for
states to control whether and where to build such pipelines within their bor4.

Beyond the exceptions created in the EPAct 2005, federal authority over interstate electric
transmission lines has generally been limited to the portions of those lines that cross federal
lands and the approval of transmission lines to connect federal hydropower facilities to the
electric grid. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.

5.

Our Company, WILLIAMS, https://perma.cc/JS8N-FHFU.

6.

See New York State DepartmentofEnvironment Conservation Denies Water Quality Certificate
Requiredfor Constitution Pipeline, N.Y. DEP'T OF ENVrL. CONs. (Apr. 22, 2016), https://
perma.cc/2QMJ-2GKV; Constitution Committed to Building FederallyApproved Pipeline, Delivering Energy Savings andEnvironmentalBenefits to Northeast US., CONsTrrvrsoN PIPELINE (Apr. 25, 2016), https://perma.cc/JA4B-AL92.

7.

15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717f(c)-(h) (2012).

8.

When we refer to the "siting" of a pipeline or an electric transmission line, we mean the state
or federal regulatory approval of the pipeline or transmission line, through the issuance of a
certificate of need, certificate of public convenience and necessity, or similar approval
mechanism.

9.

This policy change was made because state legislatures and regulatory agencies had blocked
several interstate natural gas pipelines from Oklahoma and Texas to East Coast cities, leading to natural gas shortages and industry layoffs and shutdowns. Alexandra B. Klass, The
Electric Gridat a Crossroads. A RegionalApproach to Siting Transmission Lines, 48 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 1895, 1906-07 (2015).
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ders."o This makes New York's effort to use its CWA to stop the Constitution
Pipeline-a decision that the pipeline's sponsors called "unprecedented,"" and
that could be repeated in other controversial natural gas pipeline cases-even
more significant than DOE's efforts to approve the Plains & Eastern Clean
Line.12
This Article explores how these two distinct regulatory decisions stem
from similar tensions and, despite different statutory frameworks, can best be
addressed with similar legal solutions. Both regulatory actions occurred against
the backdrop of a rapidly changing domestic energy supply landscape that experts and policymakers could not and did not contemplate even a decade ago.
Since 2007, the U.S. hydraulic fracturing boom has opened up vast, low-cost
natural gas resources in Pennsylvania and other states that had not been major
energy-producing centers for over a century.'" During this same time period,
utility-scale wind energy grew dramatically in the Midwest and Plains states,
and dropped so significantly in cost that it is competitive with traditional fossil
fuel electric energy resources in many parts of the country.1 4 The abundance of
these new energy resources in new locations has led private investors to explore
the development of new energy transport infrastructure necessary to move these
new energy resources to where they are needed.
As these current controversies illustrate, the federal government faces considerable pressure from energy suppliers, consumers, and infrastructure project
developers (and in the case of the Plains & Eastern Clean Line, from clean
energy advocates) to help facilitate the means of transporting these new domestic energy resources. For both projects, there is also an equally forcefl resistance to new energy infrastructure from some private property owners, states,
and environmental advocates, primarily out of concern that these multistate
transportation projects could unduly interfere with private property rights or
10.
11.
12.

13.

14.

Id.
Constitution Pipeline Refused Water Permit by New York Regulator, SHALE GAS INT'L (Apr.
27, 2016), https://perma.cc/AC2W-Q4NT.
As explained later in the Article, DOE's ability to rely on section 1222 of EPAct 2005 to
approve an electric transmission line project is limited to certain western states. By contrast,
a state's ability to deny water quality certification under the CWA applies to any FERCapproved natural gas pipeline throughout the country. See infra notes 97-114, 156-59 and
accompanying text.
See, e.g., Jenny Mandel, 2017 Will Bring Fundamental Natural Gas Market Sbft, EI Says,
ENERGYWIRE (July 13, 2016) (discussing significant rise in U.S. natural gas production and
exports as a result of hydraulic fracturing technology and the permitting and construction of
new export facilities to meet demand).
See Katie Fehrenbacher, Wind Now Competes with FossilFuels. Solar Almost Does., FORTUNE
(Oct. 6, 2015), https://perma.cc/M6NX-P6BL; see also LAZARD, LAzARD's LEVELIZED
CosT OF ENERGY ANALYSIS VERSION

10.0 (2016), https://perma.cc/VXW4-PNQQ

(showing that utility-scale wind and solar energy is cost competitive with fossil fuel energy
resources to generate electricity).
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state environmental resources. For instance, in New England, the region's natural gas suppliers have relied on more expensive imported natural gas transported
by ship from the Caribbean to meet consumer demand because of local opposition to new pipeline infrastructure that could transport less expensive natural
gas from the Marcellus Shale region in Pennsylvania."s This has resulted in new
federalism conflicts between federal regulators and state legislatures and agencies. The federalism tension presented by energy transportation projects is
hardly novel. But the current demand to transport new energy supply resources
to customers, coupled with the emergence of new market actors (such as
merchant transmission line companies), presents new pressure points and has
led to renewed efforts by regulators, interested parties, and courts to better demarcate these jurisdictional battle lines to favor either state or federal authority
to make regulatory siting determinations.
Efforts to address these tensions are critical for the energy industry, environmental advocates, and the public. In the natural gas pipeline context, it will
be difficult for electric utilities to replace coal-fired generation with gas-fired
generation at a reasonable cost in regions of the country that do not have natural gas resources without expanded pipeline infrastructure. As for the electricity
sector, it will be difficult if not impossible to integrate large percentages of
utility-scale wind and solar energy into the nationwide electric grid without
long-distance, interstate transmission lines to transport these renewable energy
resources from where they can be generated in the Midwest and Plains States to
population centers."6 Moreover, even putting renewable energy needs aside, the
grid is in need of expansion to address congestion and aging infrastructure, and
to meet ongoing reliability concerns."7 Finally, the federalism battles over these
projects are a harbinger of the difficulties to come in any fuiture efforts to pursue
large infrastructure projects beyond pipelines and transmission lines, such as
intra-city or inter-city rail expansion.

15.
16.

17.

To Avoid Pipelines, New England Favors Imported Fuel, ENERGYWIRE (July 13, 2016).
See, e.g., Herman K. Trabish, Utility Wind Rush Set to Strengthen as Low Prices Allow Resource to SpreadAcross Nation, UTILITYDIVE (Mar. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/7CML-3ZJ7
(reporting on rapid growth of wind energy generation but noting that transmission capacity
remains a significant constraint on growth and that "U]ust as transmission capacity can be a
wind enabler, the lack of it can be an impediment to deployment").
See, e.g., Am. Soc'Y OF Civ. ENG'RS, 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD, ENERGY 2
(2017), https://perma.cc/RWK3-MT5R (giving a D+ grade to the nation's energy infrastructure, reasoning that the grid is decades old, in need of replacement, and that lack of
adequate capacity "raises concerns with distribution, reliability, and cost of service, producing
constraints for delivering power from remote generation sites, specifically from renewable
sources, to consumers"). But see Steve Huntoon, ElectricInfrastructure:Sky Keeps Not Falling,
RTO INSIDER, Apr. 18, 2017 (arguing that the American Society of Civil Engineers report
is wrong in concluding that the electric grid is at risk of a failure and citing data showing
significant long-term investments in the grid).
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The regulatory actions associated with the Plains & Eastern Clean Line
and the Constitution Pipeline have already led to protracted litigation, as well
as renewed calls for reform of energy infrastructure siting regimes. They have
encouraged interest groups to entrench their respective positions in favor of
state or federal regulatory power. They also have thwarted comprehensive and
efficient energy planning, and have stood in the way of greater integration of
new technologies and more diverse energy resources.18 The Plains & Eastern
Clean Line and Constitution Pipeline projects thus provide ideal case studies
for exploring contemporary federalism disputes in energy transportation and
evaluating approaches to resolving them. As we will argue, these disputes illustrate that the focus on using either federal or state law solutions to resolve these
disputes simply misses the mark. Regulatory solutions to these kinds of disputes
will depend on a more nuanced set of regulatory tools for evaluating state and
national interests concerning new energy infrastructure-interests that neither
federal nor state law is equipped to address on its own. Ultimately, we conclude
that federal regulators-which have historically been much more attuned to
regional and national energy needs in making project siting decisions-have a
statutory responsibility to be proactive in addressing state and local interests
and concerns associated with multistate energy transport projects in cases where
federal siting authority overrides that of the states, as in the case of interstate
natural gas pipelines. Likewise, state regulators, along with private project
sponsors, also have opportunities to take additional actions to better facilitate
the collection of economic and environmental data on particular project routes
and other local land use concerns and ensure that data is part of a federal record
for review and decision.
Part I of this Article compares and contrasts the federalism balance Congress struck for approving interstate natural gas pipelines and interstate electric
transmission lines. One might assume that both types of interstate energy
transport projects are subject to a federal approval process because of their interstate nature (similar to the interstate highway system), but for historical reasons, they are subject to very different approval regimes under separate statutes.
This distinction has important implications today, when more infrastructure
projects are needed to integrate new sources of energy supply, such as wind and

18.

For example, these battles are taking place during a time when gas and electricity markets are
increasingly connected because of the growing dominance of natural gas in the electricity
sector. As recently as 1990, coal provided approximately 53% of U.S. electricity production
and natural gas provided only 12%. By contrast, in 2016, coal provided just over 30% of U.S.
electricity production and natural gas provided nearly 34%. See What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/8MDT-ENFY; see
also ADAM SIEMINSKI, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017, at
30 (2017), https://perma.cc/3LKY-KAU3 (showing that natural gas-fired electricity generation surpassed coal-fired electricity generation in 2016).
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solar energy, into interstate energy markets and to facilitate greater deployment
of new technologies, like utility-scale battery storage.
Part II discusses legal developments in the federal approval process for
interstate natural gas pipelines, and shows how these developments have impacted the current disputes over the Constitution Pipeline project in New York.
It then explores the laws governing interstate electric transmission lines, and
shows how those developments have impacted the current disputes over the
Plains & Eastern Clean Line project. A review of these two projects shows that
the arguments in favor of each project focus on the multistate, regional, and
national benefits associated with low-cost natural gas and low-cost wind energy, while the arguments against each project focus on private property rights
and impacts on local environmental and aesthetic resources. Part II also evaluates how congressional efforts to shift the federalism balance are at the source
of both disputes. In the case of the Plains & Eastern Clean Line, section 1222
of the EPAct 2005 created new authority for DOE to partner with certain
private transmission line projects and, to some extent, override state primacy-in
the field of electric transmission line siting and approval in certain parts of the
country.19 In the case of the Constitution Pipeline, section 401 of the CWA
gives states a potential veto point over projects, despite federal primacy in the
field of natural gas pipeline siting and approval. 20
We believe that these current federalism skirmishes foreshadow continued
battles between the states and the federal government over energy transport
infrastructure projects. We also think that, under existing law, courts are illequipped to solve these entrenched jurisdictional disputes on their own. It is a
feature of federalism that some legal battles just cannot be won by focusing on
jurisdictional lines, no matter how hard they are fought. Rather, these struggles
should lead federal agencies, states, and project proposers to re-evaluate regulatory review and approval of these types of interstate infrastructure projects. Part
III demonstrates the process and legal benefits of procedural reforms to energy
project permitting. Based on the case studies in this Article, we advocate for a
more proactive role by federal and state agencies, as well as private project
sponsors, to help ensure early and full evaluation of federal, state, and local
concerns within existing regulatory frameworks. To the extent that federal
agencies proactively solicit and consider state concerns and interests in siting
proceedings and begin to ensure that data developed by states concerning environmental impacts is considered part of the record for permitting decisions, this
holds promise to improve the efficiency and quality of agency decisions, reduce
the likelihood of reversal by courts, and diffuse the most obstructionist interest
group behaviors. Perhaps more than any past disputes, these most recent con19.

42 U.S.C. § 16421 (2012); infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.

20.

33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d) (2012); infra notes 97-114 and accompanyng text.
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flicts present an opportunity for a constitutive transformation towards a more
collaborative siting process that recognizes more integrated rules for both regulators and project sponsors in addition to supporting a more comprehensive
assessment of a project's benefits and burdens.

I.

CONVENTIONAL BATTLE LINES FOR APPROVAL OF INTERSTATE
ENERGY TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE

Although interstate natural gas pipelines and interstate electric transmission lines are both necessary to transport energy supply resources from production sites to distribution points, the regulatory structure governing approval for
building each type of infrastructure differs, primarily for historical reasons. This
Part begins with a discussion of the events leading up to the Natural Gas Act of
1938, which transferred siting and eminent domain authority for interstate natural gas pipelines from the states to FERC's predecessor agency, the FPC, in
order to allow consideration of national need rather than solely in-state need for
any particular interstate pipeline. It then discusses the contrasting situation of
siting and eminent domain authority for interstate electric transmission lines.
Unlike interstate natural gas pipelines, most interstate electric transmission
lines are subject solely to state law approval often based primarily on an evaluation of the in-state need for the line rather than regional or national need.
A.

The Federalization of Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Siting

Natural gas is a fossil fuel-originating from the remains of plants and
animals buried and compressed underground for millions of years-that is
trapped in layers of rocks. 21 Natural gas was first discovered in the United States
in the mid-1800s. 2 2 By the early 1920s, large natural gas reserves had been
discovered in Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Louisiana, leading to significant
growth (as well as consolidation) of the natural gas industry. 23 Concerns about
monopoly power in the natural gas industry led Congress to adopt the Natural
Gas Act of 1938, which created federal authority in the FPC to regulate natural
gas prices and sales and established a federal process-the federal certificate of
public convenience and necessity ("certificate")-for the approval and siting of
interstate natural gas pipelines. 24 Several years later, Congress expanded federal
jurisdiction to include eminent domain authority for these interstate natural gas
21.

Background, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://perma.cc/H58C-NX4J. Natural gas is an odorless,
colorless liquid made up of hydrocarbons-primarily methane-but also containing ethane,
butane, and propane. Id.

22.

History, NATURALGAS.ORG, https://perma.cc/GQ7L-3NJY.

23.

CHRISTOPHER J. CASTANEDA, INVISIBLE FUEL: MANUFACTURED AND NATURAL GAS IN
AMERICA, 1800-2000, at 84 (1999).

24.

15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717f(c)-(h); see also CASTANEDA, supra note 23, at 107.
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pipelines when states, influenced by coal and railroad interests, refused to grant
eminent domain authority to interstate natural gas pipelines delivering gas to
the East Coast.25
Under section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, a company must obtain a certificate from FERC to construct, extend, acquire, or operate any facility to transport or sell natural gas in interstate commerce. 26 The provision applies to
interstate natural gas pipelines (as well as related facilities, such as compressor
stations), authorizing FERC to issue the certificate after notice, a hearing,. and
a determination that the company is "able and willing to comply" with the
applicable federal regulations governing pipelines, and the pipeline "is or will be
required by the present or future public convenience and necessity." 27 FERC
may attach "reasonable terms and conditions" to the certificate, either by issuing a "blanket" certificate which allows the company to construct the pipeline
and engage in other activities without seeking further FERC approval or by
conditioning approval on future events.28 Pursuant to a 1999 FERC policy
statement, FERC's certificate evaluation considers "the enhancement of competitive transportation alternatives, the possibility of overbuilding, the avoidance of unnecessary disruptions of the environment, and the unneeded exercise
of eminent domain." 29 Although this evaluation takes the impact on state environmental resources into account, the primary focus of the analysis is on multistate regional or national "need" for the project rather than the specific impact
on the states in which the pipeline travels, since natural gas markets are not
contained within a single state's borders. Moreover, in 1988, the U.S. Supreme
Court confirmed that the Natural Gas Act occupies the field of interstate natural gas rates, facilities, and sale of natural gas, thus preempting state law.'o
25.

26.
27.

Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure
Challenges, 100 IowA L. REv. 947, 994-99 (2015) (discussing the history behind the enactment of the Natural Gas Act and transfer of authority over interstate natural gas pipeline
siting and eminent domain from the states to the FPC in 1947).
15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(a).
15 U.S.C. §§ 717f(c)-717f(e); see also BRANDON MURRILL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,

R44432,

PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION OF NATURAL GAS AND CRUDE OIL: FEDERAL AND

STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY 2

28.

29.

30.

(2016).

15 U.S.C. § 717f(e); 18 C.F.R. §§ 157.203, 157.206, 157.208; see also N. Nat. Gas Co. v.
Iowa Utils. Bd., 377 F.3d 817, 819 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining FERC blanket certificates).
All such activities must be consistent with federal environmental statutes such as the Clean
Air Act ("CAA"), the CWA, and the Coastal Zone Management Act. See infra Part II.A.
Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88 FERC ¶ 61,227 (Sept.
15, 1999). This policy statement was further clarified in 2000. Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 92 FERC ¶ 61,094 (July 28, 2000). See also Myersville
Citizens for a Rural Cmty., Inc. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 306-08 (1988); see also Myersville
Citizensfor a Rural Cmty., Inc., 783 F.3d at 1315 (citing Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 306-08);
N Nat. Gas Co., 377 F.3d at 821-23 (finding that FERC's extensive environmental standards for granting certificates for interstate natural gas pipelines preempt any more stringent
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Thus, as a result of the Natural Gas Act of 1938 and subsequent court
decisions interpreting it, FERC has plenary authority over siting and eminent
domain for interstate natural gas pipelines and associated infrastructure, leaving
the states with minimal authority over those projects and relegating them primarily to intervenor status. Accordingly, states can participate in the certificate
process and appeal to the courts in the event of a decision adverse to state
interests, but cannot generally override the grant of a certificate.'
Nevertheless, Congress, and FERC itself, have left some room for state
regulation. First, in the EPAct 2005, discussed in more detail below, Congress
enacted a savings clause which protects states' "rights" from preemption under
three federal environmental statutes-the CWA, the Clean Air Act ("CAA"),
and the Coastal Zone Management Act.3 2 Each of these statutes delegates authority to states to either (1) obtain federal approval for state environmental
standards to be implemented as part of the federal review of a project (e.g.,
State Implementation Plans that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") approves under the CAA and federally approved Coastal Zone Management Plans under the Coastal Zone Management Act) or (2) impose state
conditions on federal permits (i.e., the section 401 state water certification process under the CWA). These federal statutes are unique in that they encourage
federal-state cooperation by transforming what would otherwise simply be state
regulations or conditions into federal standards that apply to the project subject
to federal approval.33 In other words, these federal environmental laws provide
states "with the option of being deputized regulators under the authority of
federal law."3 4 But apart from these three statutes that delegate federal authority
to the states and are subject to the Natural Gas Act savings clause, state envi-

31.

32.
33.
34.

state environmental standards). Federal law can preempt state law under the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution when Congress expressly states that it intends to preempt
state regulation (express preemption), when Congress regulates so pervasively that it creates
an inference that Congress left no room for state law (implied field preemption), or if state
regulations conflict with federal law, even if Congress has not completely occupied the field
(implied conflict preemption). See id. at 821.
MURRILL, supra note 27, at 3-5.
15 U.S.C. § 717b(d).
Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty., Inc., 783 F.3d at 1315 (discussing savings clause);
MURRILL, supra note 27, at 4.
See Islander E. Pipeline Co., LLC v. Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 482 F.3d 72, 89 (2d Cir.
2006); see also Islander E. Pipeline Co., LLC v. Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 525 F.3d 141,
143 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[Tlhe Clean Water and Coastal Zone Management Acts are notable in
effecting a federal-state partnership to ensure water quality and coastal management around
the country, so that state standards approved by the federal government become the federal
standard for that state.").
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ronmental regulations that might go beyond the requirements of a FERC certificate are preempted.35
Second, FERC itself has stated that even though the Natural Gas Act and
FERC regulations "generally preempt state and local law," FERC encourages
applicants "to cooperate with state and local agencies with regard to the siting
of pipeline facilities, environmental mitigation measures, and construction procedures."36 According to FERC, despite the preemptive effect of the Natural
Gas Act, "as a matter of policy" and "in part to implement the National Environmental Policy Act,"3 7 FERC requires applicants to cooperate with state and
local authorities "through conditions placed in newly issued certificates of public convenience and necessity."38 But FERC was careful to note that this encouragement of federal-state cooperation "does not mean that state and local
agencies, through application of state and local laws, may prohibit or unreasonably delay the construction of facilities approved by this Commission."" Thus,
while FERC encourages federal-state cooperation, to the extent there is a conflict between state and federal law, or state law interferes or unreasonably delays
the construction of a project with a certificate, the certificate trumps state and
local laws."0
The fact that federal law rather than state law governs the construction of
interstate natural gas pipelines has allowed the natural gas industry to significantly expand the infrastructure necessary to meet increased production when
necessary. For instance, between 1950 and the 1980s, U.S. natural gas production grew significantly with the discovery of new natural gas reserves and new
technological developments. 41 Because of a streamlined federal siting process,
pipeline companies were able to triple and quadruple their capacity to meet the
demand created by new supplies. The same was true beginning in the late
2000s, with the advent of hydraulic fracturing, which allowed natural gas companies to access massive new reserves of natural gas trapped in shale rock in
Pennsylvania, Texas, Oklahoma, and other states. Between 2000 and 2011,
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

41.

See N Nat. Gas Co., 377 F.3d at 824 (holding that regulations imposed by the Iowa Utilities
Board requiring particular recovery of agricultural land after natural gas pipeline developments were preempted by the Natural Gas Act).
Maritimes & Ne. Pipeline, LLC, 80 FERC ¶ 61,166, 61,729 (1997) (quoting Iroquois Gas
Transmission Sys., L.P., 59 FERC ¶ 61,094, 61,346 (1992)).
Maritimes & Ne. Pipeline, LLC, 80 FERC at 61,730.
N Nat. Gas Co., 377 F.3d at 823.
Maritimes & Ne. Pipeline, LLC, 80 FERC at 61,479 n.40; N. Nat. Gas Co., 377 F.3d at
823.
See N Nat. Gas Co., 377 F.3d at 823-24; see also MURRILL, supra note 27, at 3 ("In the past,
FERC has apparently taken the view that state or local laws that affect siting of an interstate
natural gas pipeline facility might not be preempted unless they conflict with FERC's exercise of its jurisdiction under federal law or would pose an obstacle to the facility's
construction.").
Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 25, at 998-99.

HarvardEnvironmentalLaw Review

434

[Vol. 41

pipeline companies built 14,600 miles of interstate natural gas pipelines, and
twice as much transmission capacity was added to the U.S. natural gas pipeline
network in 2008 as in 2007.42 A 2013 Government Accountability Office report concluded that, based on industry statistics, most interstate natural gas
pipelines can obtain approval within a year and be built and put into operation
soon after that. 43 Moreover, in the EPAct 2005, Congress created new
processes to streamline and expedite the construction of natural gas infrastructure. The new law made FERC the lead agency for federal environmental review of pipeline projects, granted FERC exclusive authority to review and
approve liquefied natural gas ("LNG") import and export terminals (which are
used to transport natural gas across oceans in liquefied form stored in tankers),
and, as discussed in more detail in Part II, granted a right of immediate appeal
to the federal circuit courts for any action by states to block a pipeline project
FERC has approved."
Thus, with a few exceptions discussed above and in Part II, the federal
government, through FERC, has exclusive siting and eminent domain authority over interstate natural gas pipelines. Although states may comment on and
participate in the federal process, they possess limited independent authority to
say "no" to a federally-approved project or its routing. For many decades, this
sweeping federal authority over natural gas pipeline approval and routing was
not particularly controversial. Expanding natural gas pipeline infrastructure allowed for increased supplies of natural gas across the country, leading to lower
gas prices for heating and, in more recent years, allowed natural gas to replace
coal as the dominant fuel to generate electricity. Although the production of
natural gas, particularly via hydraulic fracturing, can have significant adverse
environmental and land use impacts, its displacement of coal has allowed the
United States to reduce its contribution to global greenhouse gas ("GHG")
emissions even while the economy grew. This is because even though there are
significant GHG emissions associated with the production of natural gas, the
use of natural gas in power plants to generate electricity produces far fewer
GHG emissions than the equivalent amount of energy produced in coal-fired
power plants.45
42.

INTERSTATE NAT. GAS Ass'N OF AM. FOUND., NORTH AMERICAN NATURAL GAS MIDSTREAM INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH 2035: A SECURE ENERGY FUTURE 8-9 (2011);
PAUL

W.

PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS PIPELINES:

PROCESS AND TIMING OF FERC APPLICATION REVIEw 8 (2015).

43.

See PARFoMAK, supra note 42, at 8.

44.

Id.; MURRILL, supra note 27; MICHAEL RATNER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.
NATURAL GAS ExPORTS: NEw OPPORTUNITIES, UNCERTAIN OUTCOMES 3-5 (2015); Alexandra B. Klass, Future-proofingEnergy Transport Law, WASH. U. L. REv. (forthcoming
2017) (discussing clarification by Congress in EPAct 2005 that FERC, rather than the
states, have exclusive siting authority over LNG import and export terminals).

45.

LINCOLN

L.

DAVIES FT AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY

126-27 (2015).
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But in recent years, environmental advocates have partnered with landowners to pressure state and local governments to oppose the development of
all fossil fuels, including natural gas, in favor of renewable energy alternatives.46
Opponents to these projects have focused on the climate change impacts of
fossil fuels as well as the water pollution and adverse land use impacts associated with both natural gas and oil pipelines. Controversy over the Keystone XL
oil pipeline and the Dakota Access pipeline has drawn particular attention to
the role energy transport infrastructure can play in facilitating the increased
production and use of fossil fuels, and throughout the 2010s there has been a
well-coordinated effort to more broadly oppose all fossil fuel infrastructure
projects. 47 This opposition has been more challenging in the natural gas context
than the oil context because FERC is more difficult to influence on a projectby-project basis than a state legislature or state public utility commission that
has jurisdiction over interstate oil pipelines but not interstate natural gas pipelines. Some environmental groups have even accused FERC of harboring institutional bias in favor of approving pipeline projects and against any sort of
comprehensive environmental review of pipelines. 48 Due to such concerns, pressure is growing, leading to new legal efforts to create cracks in the federal process attempting to streamline new natural gas transport infrastructure.49
B.

State Primacy in Interstate Electric Transmission Line Siting

The history and current status of siting and eminent domain for interstate
electric transmission lines is quite different from that of interstate natural gas

46.

47.

48.

49.

See Hannah Northey, Developers Face "New Reality" ofProtests, Longer Reviews, GREENWIRE
(June 3, 2016), http://perma.cc/R843-LL5K (discussing recent delays in FERC approval
process for interstate natural gas pipelines in part due to increasing numbers of applications
and in part due to increased opposition by landowners and environmental groups requiring
additional environmental review by FERC).
Klass, supra note 44; see, e.g., Robinson Meyer, Donald Trump and the Order of the Pipelines,
THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2017), http://perma.cc/ZJF4-A7CW; Darran Simon & Eliott C.
McLaughlin, Keystone and Dakota Access Pipelines: How Did We Get Here?, CNN (Jan. 25,
2017), http://perma.cc/9U76-F862.
See "Institutional"Bias Lead to FERC Approvals-Enviros, ENERGYWIRE (Mar. 6, 2017),
http://perma.cc/25FN-ZY7W. As the Delaware Riverkeeper Network noted in a brief filed
with the D.C. Circuit, "[T]he commission, PennEast, the United States, and amici collectively cannot cite a single instance in the last 30 years that refutes plaintiffs' allegation that
the commission has a 100 percent voting record for approving natural gas pipeline projects,
that the commission has never issued an environmental assessment recommending further
environmental review, or that the commission has never granted a rehearing request of a
nonindustry party." Keith Goldberg, FERC Pipeline Powers Cause Actionable Harm, Enviros
Say, LAw360 (June 8, 2016), http://perma.cc/3DSB-L6LH.
See generally infra notes 169, 197-99, 289 (discussing EPA and environmental interest group
pressures on FERC).
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pipelines-exhibiting an institutional bias in favor of states rather than the federal government in project siting.
At the time Congress was creating federal authority over the natural gas
industry and natural gas transport infrastructure in the 1930s, the nation's electric grids remained fairly localized. At the turn of the twentieth century, Westinghouse and General Electric-the first public utilities founded by George
Westinghouse and Thomas Edison with the later help of Samuel Insull-used
the electric transmission technology they developed to begin to transmit power
longer distances.s0 Between 1893 and 1903, transmission distances grew from
two miles to over one hundred miles. Cities like Philadelphia consolidated
neighborhood electric companies into a single utility.ui Both municipally owned
utilities and private utility companies began to achieve economies of scale and
increased efficiency, and linked steam turbines and hydropower generation facilities to provide greater amounts of power to customers over longer distances
with greater reliability.5 2
By the 1920s, utilities across the country were constructing interstate electric transmission lines in addition to intrastate lines, and state public utility
commissions began to regulate electricity rates in exchange for granting utilities
monopolies over designated service territories to reduce overbuilding of infrastructure and increase efficiencies." In 1927, the Supreme Court declared that
the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution prevented states from
regulating interstate sales of electricity because of the threat of discrimination
against out-of-state interests and declared that only Congress could fill the reg4
ulatory gap (known as the "Attleboro gap" after the Supreme Court's decision).1
This holding led Congress to enact the Federal Power Act of 1935, in which it
granted the FPC jurisdiction over the sale of wholesale electricity in interstate
commerce and the transmission of electricity in interstate commerce, and required the agency to ensure that prices set for these transactions were nondiscriminatory and "just and reasonable."" At the time, however, there was not the
same urgency to create federal authority over interstate electric transmission
lines. Most transmission lines were fairly localized and owned by state regulated
50.

Klass, supra note 9, at 1909-13.

51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., DAVIES ET AL., supra note 45, at 310-11, 317-18 (explaining the "regulatory compact" between electric utilities and states, whereby the utility receives an exclusive service
territory free from competition in exchange for allowing the state to regulate prices and
services); Jim Rossi, REGULATORY BARGAINING AND PUBLIc LAw 1-27 (2005) (describing the history, evolving scope, and legal significance of the regulatory compact in the electric power sector).
Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1927); see also
New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5-8 (2002) (describing Attleboro gap and congressional
response); FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 767, 780-81 (2015).
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 5-8.

54.

55.
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public utilities. Throughout the 1900s, these grids were interconnected, but
most lines were designed to serve a single utility's customers (either in-state or
in adjoining states) or in some cases crossed a single state border to connect
with a utility in a neighboring state.56
Moreover, electric generating plants powered by coal, nuclear energy, or
natural gas (which could be transported to the generating plants by railroad,
truck, ship, or pipeline), could be constructed near population centers, and thus
did not require electric transmission lines that crossed multiple state borders.
As for hydropower, although investor-owned public utilities utilized (and continue to utilize) this renewable resource where it was and is plentiful (such as in
the Pacific Northwest), the federal government, through the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, constructed the bulk of the
nation's major hydropower facilities and related infrastructure." Thus, there
was no real need in the early part of the twentieth century for private, investorowned utilities to build long-distance transmission lines that crossed multiple
states, and thus no real pressure on Congress to displace state jurisdiction over
such lines in favor of a single, federal approval process. In other words, the
economic and geographic demands on the natural gas system in the early twentieth century described in Part I.B that drove a shift from state to federal siting
authority for interstate natural gas pipelines did not exist in the electricity sector
at that time. This time period, of course, particularly the New Deal period of
the 1930s and 1940s, was precisely the time when Congress was most open to
expanding federal authority in many areas of the U.S. economy." Because state
laws were blocking the expansion of natural gas infrastructure during that time,
but not electricity infrastructure, the New Deal expansion of federal authority
in general was implemented strongly in the area of natural gas transportation
but not in the area of electricity transportation."
It was not until the latter part of the twentieth century-long after the
New Deal era of federal regulatory expansion was over-that pressure began to
build on the interstate electric grid, and the limitations of leaving interstate
electric transmission line siting and eminent domain authority to the states became more evident. This process began with the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, in which Congress required for the first time that investorowned utilities purchase power from alternative generators-most notably, renewable energy generators-at the same price it would cost the utility to gener-

56.

Klass, supra note 9, at 1915-16.

57.

KELSI

58.

Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challengesfor Renewable
Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1862-63 (2012).

59.

Id.

BRACMORT, ADAM VANN & CHARLES STERN, HYDROPOWER: FEDERAL AND
NONFEDERAL INVESTMENT 1-5 (2015).
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ate its own power. 60 However, utilities did not necessarily want to grant access
to electric transmission lines (which they controlled) to alternative power generators. This resistance led to a series of FERC orders in the 1990s and 2000s
that required utilities to grant "open access" to the transmission grid at nondiscriminatory prices published in advance in "transmission tariffs" and imposed
new requirements on investor-owned utilities and other transmission owners to
engage in regional planning processes for new transmission.6 Congressional
legislation and FERC orders during this time also authorized and encouraged
the creation of "regional transmission organizations" ("RTOs") and "independent system operators" ("ISOs")-nonprofit entities that utilities and other
transmission providers may join-that manage the transmission of interstate
electricity through the transmission lines, substations, and other physical transmission-related assets of their members. 62 Many RTOs also run organized
wholesale electricity markets within their regional footprints.6 3 These regional
organizations operate an interconnected interstate transmission grid, facilitating
the delivery of bulk power over a large multistate area6 4 that includes more than
60% of the U.S. power supply.65
Also during the 1990s and 2000s, as states enacted renewable portfolio
standards ("RPSs") mandating that utilities and other electricity providers generate or purchase a certain percentage of electricity from renewable energy
sources, the cost of non-hydropower renewable energy began to drop. 66 These
60.
61.
62.

63.

Alexandra B. Klass &Jim Rossi, Revitalizing DormantCommerce Clause Review for Interstate
Coordination, 100 MINN. L. REv. 129, 145 (2015) (discussing FERC orders).
Id. at 147-48.
Id. at 141-42, 147-48. Although RTOs and ISOs oversee the day-to-day operation of electric transmission lines and coordinate the planning of new transmission lines within their
footprints, the power to actually approve the construction of these lines remains with the
states.
Id. For a summary of the geographic areas covered by RTOs, see Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FERC, http://perma.cc/HX7AEZ9H; see also Electric Power Markets: National Overview, FERC, http://perma.cc/5ET9-

LYH9.
64.

65.

Grid reliability is based on the resilience of grid assets within three large "interconnections"
within the United States-one covering the United States approximately east of the Rocky
Mountains (the Eastern Interconnection), another covering the United States approximately
west of the Rocky Mountains (the Western Interconnection), and a separate interconnection
for Texas (the Electric Reliability Council of Texas or "ERCOT"). See Learn More About
Interconnections, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://perma.cc/2PUY-8HNT; see also North
American Electric Reliability Corporation Interconnections, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://per
ma.cc/Z9RW-HWFF.
See About 60% of the U.S. Electric Power Supply is Managed by RTOs, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN.

66.

(Apr. 4, 2011), http://perma.cc/G7UJ-K2EE.

See generally Klass, supra note 44 (discussing trends in electric energy resources); see also Ann
C. Mulkern, Utility Nears Hitting 33% Green Power Mandate, ENERGYWIRE (Mar. 17,
2017), https://perma.cc/T9J4-QGG5 (reporting that California's largest utility, Pacific Gas
& Electric, delivered nearly 33% of its electricity from wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, and
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laws were prompted by concerns over the electric power sector's contribution to
global climate change (constituting over 30% of U.S. GHG emissions-the
largest single contributor), new technological and market pressures, and efforts
to promote economic development in rural areas (where wind turbines and solar
farms are often sited).67 In some states, as a result of RPSs, non-hydropower
renewable energy sources such as wind and solar generate more than 20% of
electricity needs.68 On a nationwide basis, that percentage is more modest but
increasing: not quite 9% non-hydropower renewable energy generation in 2016,
compared to approximately 2% prior to 1990.69 Still, the falling costs of renewable energy production, coupled with favorable tax incentives and ample supplies
(at least in some areas) means the potential exists for much more significant
growth."' But renewable energy resources bring additional challenges to the
electric transmission grid. Unlike coal, uranium, or natural gas, which can be
transported through existing energy transport pathways such as ships, trucks,
and pipelines, renewable energy can, for the time being, only be transported via
electric transmission lines and cannot be stored for later use.' And like natural
gas, renewable energy resources, particularly wind energy, are not evenly distributed throughout the country. For instance, the best wind generation re-

small-scale hydroelectric resources in 2016, coming very close to meeting its 2020 RPS mandate of 33% renewable energy).

67.

See, e.g., CLEAN ENERGY STATEs' ALLIANCE, THE STATE OF STATE RENEWABLE PORT-

STANDARDS (2013); State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT'L COUNCIL
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://perma.cc/Z6T2-RFMQ Lincoln L. Davies, State Renewable Portfolio Standards:Is There a "Race"andIs It to "the Top"?, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE
ENERGY L. 3 (2011-12).
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68.

69.

70.
71.

See, e.g., Daniel Cusick, Midwestern States Now Get a Ffth of Their Powerfrom Wind, CLIMATEWIRE (Mar. 7, 2017), http://perma.cc/9MUT-EHFY (discussing surge in investment
in U.S. wind power and the fact that several Midwestern states now produce over 20% of
their electricity from wind energy).
Klass, supra note 9, at 1931-35; Klass, supra note 44; see also What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://perma.cc/NT7N-CKWN; Electricity, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/33S2-9KLN (forecasting that nonhydropower renewable energy will grow to 9% of total electricity generation in 2017 and
10% in 2018). At the end of 2016, wind energy alone surpassed hydropower for the first time
as the largest source of renewable electricity. Diane Cardwell, Capacity of Wind Power Surpasses Hydroelectric, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2017, at B2.
Klass, supra note 9, at 1931-35.
This limitation on renewable energy may change if grid-scale and distribution-level battery
storage technologies become commercially viable, allowing wind and solar energy to be
stored for later use when the wind is not blowing and the sun is not shining. See Diane
Cardwell & Clifford Krauss, A Big Testfor Big Batteries, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 14, 2017), https:/
/perma.cc/9L5S-6JNH; Paolo D'Aprile et al., The New Economics ofEnergy Storage, McKINSEY & Co. (Aug. 2016), https://perma.cc/MB53-3GAD.
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sources are located in the middle of the country far from population centers and
from existing long-distance, high-voltage electric transmission infrastructure.7 2
These factors have created new incentives for the construction of longdistance, high-voltage transmission lines to bring renewable energy to population centers, along with new market actors, such as merchant transmission line
companies." For instance, Clean Line Energy Partners, a merchant transmission line company, has proposed five separate high-voltage direct current
("HVDC") transmission lines across the Midwest and Southwest to bring wind
power to population centers.7 4 The U.S. electric grid was built using high-voltage alternating current ("AC") transmission lines (meaning that the voltage and
the current on those lines oscillates in a wave-like pattern), because the technology did not exist to efficiently convert the high voltages traveling on direct
current ("DC") lines to the lower voltage necessary for use in homes and businesses." Today though, HVDC lines can move large amounts of power long
distances more efficiently than AC lines and with less "line losses" as the electricity travels over the line."
However, states, public utilities, and other competing sources of electricity
generation have often opposed these new, interstate transmission lines." Some
state public utilities and state legislatures see no significant in-state benefits to
72.

73.

74.
75.
76.

77.

DENNIS ELLIOTT ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., 80 AND 100 METER WIND
ENERGY RESOURCE POTENTIAL FOR THE UNITED STATES (2010), https://perma.cc/

ZK6U-ETDE.
Unlike public utilities which receive a regulated, cost-based rate of return from electricity
customers on transmission line projects and other investments, merchant transmission companies assume the risk of the project and obtain revenue solely from contracts they sign with
electricity generators to transmit electricity over the line. See Heidi Werntz, Let's Make a
Deal: Negotiated Rates for Merchant Transmission, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 421, 424 n.13
(2011).
See Projects, CLEAN LINE ENERGY PARTNERS, http://perma.cc/YRZ2-GRWH (showing
map of projects).
See Patrick J. Kiger, High-Voltage DC Breakthrough Could Boost Renewable Energy, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2012), http://perma.cc/35UC-D926.
See Klass, supra note 9, at 1928; How HVDC Works, CLEAN LINE ENERGY PARTNERS,
http://perma.cc/NG22-EWNT; SIEMENS, FACT SHEET: HIGH-VOLTAGE DIRECT CURRENT TRANSMISSION (HVDC) 2 (2014), http://perma.cc/YK8C-TVR6; Rise of the Supergrid, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 14, 2017) (explaining benefits of HVDC transmission lines for
long distances).
See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 535-36
(2008) ("Historically, electric utilities had been vertically integrated monopolies. For a particular geographic area, a single utility would control the generation of electricity, its transmission, and its distribution to consumers. Since the 1970's [sic], however, engineering
innovations have lowered the cost of generating electricity and transmitting it over long
distances, enabling new entrants to challenge the regional generating monopolies of traditional utilities.") (citations omitted); Klass & Rossi, supra note 60, at 201-17 (discussing
state laws that create barriers to new transmission market entrants in favor of in-state, incumbent public utilities).
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those lines, especially to the extent that they would carry electricity that is not
intended for use by their citizens, would impact private property rights, or
would interfere with scenic values or environmentally sensitive areas."5 Indeed,
many state public utilities commissions ("PUCs"), state legislatures, and state
courts have rejected interstate transmission lines designed to serve out-of-state
or national electricity needs as opposed to exclusively (or at least primarily) instate needs.79 Likewise, public utilities do not necessarily want competing transmission lines, and would prefer to build any lines in their territories so as to
obtain rate recovery from retail customers for the new transmission assets (at
least in traditionally regulated states).s0 Incumbent public utilities have convinced some states to enact "right of first refusal" laws to grant the utility the
initial option to build a transmission line before the option is given to nonutility transmission market actors.81 In sum, particularly in regions not part of
RTOs, public utilities may have reduced incentives to build the type of longdistance interstate transmission lines required to bring wind or solar energy to
population centers several states away, and any utility-initiated transmission
build-out is often focused on improving reliability of the existing grid within
the utilities' more limited service territories.82
Finally, although public utilities in traditionally regulated states also maintain significant generation assets, with some exceptions, those consist primarily
of coal, natural gas, and nuclear facilities. Although some public utilities are
increasingly building their own new wind and utility-scale solar plants, they
often choose instead to enter into power purchase agreements ("PPAs") with
78.
79.
80.

Klass & Rossi, supra note 60, at 181-84.
Id.
About half the states are traditionally regulated-meaning that utilities own generation assets and also sell electricity at retail to customers within a state-granted monopoly area of the

81.

82.

state-and about half are "restructured"-meaning that utilities provide transmission and
distribution services, but do not own generation capacity and, in some cases, must compete
with other retail electricity providers to sell energy services. In traditionally regulated states,
utilities obtain state-approved rate recovery from utility customers for generation, transmission, and distribution investments, while in restructured states, utilities obtain rate recovery
solely for transmission and distribution investments. See, e.g., DAVIES ET AL., supra note 45,
at 426-30; SEVERIN BORENSTEIN & JAMES BUSHNELL, ENERGY INST. AT HAAS, THE
U.S. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY AFTER 20 YEARS OF RESTRUCTURING (2015),
https://perma.cc/9SES-AY3G; REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 7-15 (2011); see generally U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, A PRIMER
ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES, DEREGULATION, AND RESTRUCTURING OF U.S. ELECTRICITY
MARKETS (2002), http://perma.cc/FPY5-4HPR.
Klass & Rossi, supra note 60, at 193-94; see also James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. Smith,
Regulatory Federalism and Development of Electric Transmission:A Brewing Storm?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 71, 88-90 (2014).
See Brian Eckhouse & Joe Ryan, Tapping Wind Power of Great Plains to Light Faraway
Cities, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 28, at A-10, Feb. 10, 2016, http://perma.cc/P3DWRR9T.
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independent power producers to meet some or all of any requirements they
have under state RPSs or otherwise add renewable energy to their generation
portfolios." Without their own wind or utility-scale solar assets, there may be
less incentive for utilities to build the high-voltage, long-distance electric transmission lines that are critical to the viability of large renewable energy projects,
but are less necessary to meet the needs of retail customers. Moreover, a major,
interstate electric transmission line often takes a decade to plan, obtain all state
approvals, and address any legal challenges to eminent domain authority, in
advance of construction, if it can be built at al. 8 4 For instance, the CapX2020
project in the Mid-Continent Independent System Operator ("MISO") RTO
has been held up as a model of several utilities working together for over a
decade to plan and build a series of interstate electric transmission lines to integrate more renewable energy into the electric grid as well as increase reliability
83.

84.

See, e.g., Trabish, supra note 16 (reporting that regulated and unregulated utilities played an
increased ownership role in wind project development in 2016, holding at least partial ownership in approximately 50% of the projects that went online that year, and that this trend "is
expected to continue into 2017, with utilities of all types expanding their investments in
wind energy through PPAs or direct ownership"); Peter Maloney, Xcel Energy Seeks to Add
1,500 MW of Wind Power, UTILrvDIVE (Sept. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/4MUB-8BZ6
(discussing Xcel Energy 2016 request for proposals for wind energy and stating that "typically Xcel has contracted for wind power using PPAs from third-party suppliers, but going
forward the company says it plans to own and operate more wind farms"); Mike Hughlett,
Xcel Unveils New Phase of Wind Power Construction, with Huge Plant in South Dakota, STAR
TRIBUNE (Mar. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/FR79-NPX3 (reporting on several new Xcel
Energy large-scale wind energy projects in multiple states, some of which Xcel will own and
place in its rate base and others which will be owned by third parties with Xcel instead
purchasing the energy under PPAs); Mark Chediak, Trump's Coal Promise Faces a Testfrom
"Monstrous" Wind Farms, ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 11 (Mar. 16, 2017) (describing Moody's
Investors Service report on how economic forces are resulting in wind energy replacing coal,
stating that "U.S. utilities are increasingly seeking to build wind power instead of buying it,
even in the absence of state mandates on renewable energy" and that "[p]ower companies see
investments in the renewable resource as an opportunity to grow earnings, lower electric bills
and offer more clean power").
JUDY W. CiANG & JOHANNEs P. PFEIFEINBERGER, THE BRATTLE GROUP, WELLPLANNED ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION
SION PLANNING

85.

SAVES CUSTOMER COSTS: IMPROVED TRANsMIs-

IS KEY TO THE TRANSITION TO A CARBON-CONSTRAINED FUTURE 4

(2016) https://perma.cc/5S65-BYP4; Klass, supra note 9, at 1928-29 & n.171; John Fialka,
Promoters of Cleaner Electric Grid Zapped by Roadblocks, E&E NEWS (Sept. 8, 2016), https://
perma.cc/H2GN-DMLA (discussing long delays in obtaining approvals for long-distance
electric transmission lines).
Electric Power Markets: Midcontinent (MISO), FERC (Mar. 10, 2016), http://perma.cc/
N546-JWSE. The CapX2020 transmission lines were part of MISO's Multi-Value Project
("MVP") transmission expansion that was subject to challenge by Illinois and several utilities
on how MISO planned to spread the costs of the expansion among its member transmission
owners. FERC approved MISO's cost allocation approach, and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed FERC's decision. See Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC,
721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2013).
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in the region. 6 Notably, a project like CapX2020 is the exception, rather than
the rule, and even that project took more than a decade to come to fruition."
Thus, by the dawn of the twenty-first century, the U.S. electric grid had
evolved from localized, primarily state-based grids, to three large regional electric grids." Additionally, with growing concern over the electricity sector's contribution to global climate change, there has been pressure at the state and
federal levels to reduce the use of coal-fired generation in favor of natural gas
(made cost competitive by hydraulic fracturing after 2007) and renewable energy resources." The United States fairly quickly has been able to replace significant amounts of coal-fired generation with natural gas due to increasing
supplies, decreasing prices, and the ability to rapidly expand the natural gas
transportation system through federal siting procedures for interstate natural
gas pipelines, including expedited "pre-filing" procedures.9 0 By contrast, the
limitations of the existing electric transmission grid; the concentration of wind
energy in the Midwest and utility scale solar energy in the Southwest; and state
siting and eminent domain barriers to new, long-distance transmission lines
have limited the ability of the nation to integrate more renewable energy into
the grid." Indeed, experts contend that more interstate, regional transmission
planning and construction is not only more cost-effective, but is necessary in
light of the aging grid (most of which was built in the 1960s and 1970s), the
need for increased reliance on renewable energy resources (which require a
86.

MARTA C. MONTI ET AL., U. OF MINN. HUMPHREY SCH. OF PUB. AFF., TRANSMISSION

PLANNING AND CAPX2020, at x-xii (2016), http://perma.cc/Z6NF-5VHZ.

87.
88.

See id. at 58.
See supra note 64, and accompanying text (explaining the three U.S. interconnections).

89.

See Klass, supra note 9, at 1931-35.

90.

See, e.g., MURRILL, supra note 27, at 2-8 (comparing the federal siting and eminent domain

processes for interstate oil pipelines and interstate natural gas pipelines and concluding that
lack of a federal process for interstate oil pipelines may make it more difficult for pipeline
companies to obtain all necessary approvals, "particularly when strong opposition from local
landowners and the public exists," as compared with interstate natural gas pipelines);

PARFOMAK, supra note 42, at 1-9 (discussing FERC's pre-filing procedures to expedite the
interstate natural gas certificate review process and finding that the FERC process takes
about a year for pre-filed projects). But see Northey, supra note 46 (citing industry figures
that the time from application through construction and operation of an average interstate

natural gas pipelines has grown from three years to four years based on increasing environmental and landowner opposition to such projects); supra note 41-44 and accompanying text
(discussing rapid interstate natural gas pipeline expansion after 2007).
BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., CAPITALIZING ON THE EVOLVING POWER SECTOR: POLICIES

FOR A MODERN AND RELIABLE U.S. ELECTRIC GRID 28-29 (2013); James J. Hoecker
Douglas W. Smith, Regulatory Federalism andDevelopment ofElectric Transmission:A Brew&

91.

ing Storm?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 82, 86-88 (2014) (discussing state siting barriers to interstate
transmission projects); Klass, supra note 9, at 1924-25; see also Richard Martin, Getting
Cheap Wind Power Where It's Needed Shouldn't Be This Hard, MIT TECH. REv. (Apr. 25,
2016), http://perma.cc/3BDY-UY6J.
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larger footprint to address variability limitations), and the fact that transmission
projects require as long as a decade to plan and construct.92 As a result, just as
changes in attitudes toward natural gas pipelines have created new pressures on
FERC to take state concerns into account in the natural gas pipeline siting
process, the same pressures have been building in reverse in the case of interstate electric transmission lines-to better recognize federal and regional electricity needs against the backdrop of a state-based siting process. These
pressures and responses to them are discussed in Part II.

II.

CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION: STATE

PRESSURE

ON NATURAL GAS

PIPELINE SITING AND FEDERAL PRESSURE ON INTERSTATE
TRANS1MISSION LINE SITING

By the latter part of the twentieth century, the conventional framework for
energy transportation infrastructure siting reflected a clear division of authority:
federal law, through FERC, governed siting and eminent domain for interstate
natural gas pipelines and state law was the primary vehicle for addressing siting
and eminent domain for interstate electric transmission lines.
There were some limited exceptions to these general rules, at least in the
case of electric transmission lines. First, if an electric transmission line crossed
federal lands, then the federal government, generally the Bureau of Land Management within the U.S. Department of the Interior, reviewed and approved
that portion of the line." But almost all lines that cross federal lands also cross
non-federal lands, and in those instances, a state siting permit from one or
more states, and if necessary, state eminent domain authority, would still be
required. Second, the hydropower provisions of the Federal Power Act provide
that federal law governs certain transmission lines necessary to connect federal
hydropower projects to the electric grid.9 4 Last, there were a few instances in
the last few decades where Congress specifically provided funding or authorization for a federal power marketing administration ("PMA") to build a line to
improve the transmission grid or enhance the distribution of existing federal
electric generation sources. 5 In those situations where Congress had directed a
92.

See, e.g., CHANG & PFEIFEINBERGER, supra note 84; see also U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, REDUCING WIND CURTAILMENT THROUGH TRANSMISSION EXPANSION IN A WIND VisioN
FUTURE, at iv-v (2017), http://perma.cc/A57M-S46W [hereinafter "REDUCING WIND
CURTAILMENT"] (finding that electric transmission expansion is "critical" to greater integration of renewable energy resources and will provide "substantial health, environmental, and

93.
94.
95.

Klass, supra note 9, at 1918.
See 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2012); see also Hoecker & Smith, supra note 91, at 82-83.
The main purpose of a PMA is to market wholesale power from federal hydropower facilities
that are generally owned by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and other federal agencies. See

economic benefits").

FederalPower MarketingAdministrations Operate Across Much of the United States, U.S. EN-

ERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 12, 2013), http://perma.cc/77UZ-YC8X (describing the PMAs
and showing map of PMA territories). PMAs also play a significant role in transmission and
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PMA to study, fund, or build a particular electric transmission project, federal
courts have held under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution that
state siting permits and eminent domain authority were not required to build
those lines.96 But these exceptions have always been narrow: for the vast majority of energy transportation projects, the general regulatory framework is based
on the conventional division between federal and state authority with virtually
complete federal authority for siting natural gas pipelines and virtually complete
state authority for siting electric transmission lines.
Beginning in the latter part of the twentieth century, however, this conventional division of authority began to unravel. Political pressure built first, in
favor of the states and environmental protection concerns in the 1970s. Then,
as the nation faced increasing concerns over reduced domestic oil and gas supplies, energy security, and a vulnerable transmission grid in the mid 2000s, the
pendulum swung back in favor of an expanded role for federal authority in both
natural gas and electricity infrastructure, as described in the sections below.
A.

FederalEnvironmentalLegislation and Expansion of State Authority
over FederalEnergy Projects

The traditional story told in connection with the environmental movement
of the 1 9 70s and the explosion of federal environmental laws at that time is that
the states were, for the most part, not doing enough to protect the nation's
waters, air, and natural resources from pollution, and thus Congress enacted the
CAA, CWA, and a host of other environmental laws to provide federal standards to address pollution, and entrusted EPA with the regulatory authority
over these new laws. This story is in large part accurate. But what this narrative
often misses is that these same federal environmental protection laws also contained provisions to allow states to exercise greater authority over federal energy
electric power systems within their regions. See id. Four PMAs-the Bonneville Power Administration ("BPA"), the Western Area Power Administration ("WAPA"), the Southeastern Power Administration ("SEPA"), and the Southwestern Power Administration
("SWPA")-sell electricity from federally owned hydropower facilities in thirty-three states
(mostly outside the northeast and Midwest states) and some PMAs operate electric transmission systems within those regions. See id. Together, the four PMAs sell approximately
40% of the nation's hydroelectricity generation. See id.
96.

See, e.g., Citizens & Landowners Against the Miles City/New Underwood Powerline v. U.S.
Dep't of Energy, 683 F.2d 1171, 1178 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that WAPA need not seek a
state siting permit prior to building a transmission line in South Dakota based on federal
statutes authorizing DOE, through the federal power agencies, to plan and build transmission lines to implement federal electricity policies and programs); United States v. 14.02
Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno Cty., 547 F.3d 943, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
that WAPA was not required to comply with California siting and eminent domain laws
when it partnered with investor-owned utilities to build transmission lines to address transmission constraints and to facilitate increased power sales between California and the Pacific
Northwest region).
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projects in order to protect state air quality, water quality, and coastal zones.
Indeed, in the area of federal energy projects (such as federal dams and hydropower projects) and federally approved energy projects (such as FERC-approved interstate natural gas pipelines or private hydropower projects), the
concern was that the federal government was compromising environmental
protection in favor of competing energy goals. In these circumstances, the
states, rather than a federal agency, were potentially in the best position to
review, question, and, at the extreme, block such projects unless state environmental protection conditions were met.
For example, section 401 of the CWA grants states the power to ensure
that projects that require federal CWA permits meet state water quality standards by essentially giving states veto power over projects that may threaten the
state's water supply.17 Congress's purpose in enacting the CWA was to "restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters" with a goal of realizing "water quality which provides for the protection
and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife."9 8 The Act was aimed at addressing national pollution broadly, but Congress also recognized the unique
ability of state and local authorities to protect their natural resources on a more
local level." Thus, section 401 of the CWA was intended to "continu[e] the
authority of the State . . . to act to deny a permit and thereby prevent a Federal

license or permit from issuing to a discharge source within such State."oo Indeed, Senator Ed Muskie stated that the rationale behind section 401 was to
ensure that:
No polluter will be able to hide behind a Federal license or permit as
an excuse for a violation of water quality standard[s]. No polluter will
be able to make major investments in facilities under a Federal license
or permit without providing assurance that the facility will comply
with water quality standards. No State water pollution control agency
will be confronted with a fait accompli by an industry that has built a
plant without consideration of water quality requirements. 101
Under section 401, an "applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any
activity ... which may result in any discharge into the navigable water[s]" must
obtain certification from the state that the project will comply with relevant
provisions of the Act, including water quality standards established by the
97.

33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2012).

Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1. v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704 (1994) (citing 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a), (a)(2)).
99. See Angus E. Crane, Who's in Charge Here? An Analysis of the Enforcement of State Water
Quality Certfication Standards, 1 Wis. ENVTL. LJ. 89, 92 (1994).
100. S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 380 (2006) (quoting S. REP. No.
92-414, at 69 (1971) (Conf. Rep.)).
101. Id. at 386 (quoting 116 CONG. REc. 8984 (1970)).
98.
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state.10 2 Section 401 thus gave states the authority to veto federally approved
projects that would result in discharges to state waters by denying water quality
certification or, in the alternative, granting certification with particular conditions imposed on projects to protect state water quality. 03
States have been active in using section 401 to block projects or impose
conditions on projects in order to protect states' water resources and the U.S.
Supreme Court has supported the states in their efforts. For instance, in 1994,
in PUD No. 1 v. Washington Department of Ecology,104 the Supreme Court reviewed whether a state environmental agency could impose minimum stream
flow requirements on a federally approved hydropower facility. 0 The Court
determined that this was a valid exercise of power Congress had delegated to
state regulators under the CWA. It reasoned that once the existence of a discharge has been established, thus invoking the section 401 certification requirement, a state may "impose 'other limitations' on the project in general to assure
compliance with various provisions of the CWA and with 'any other appropriate requirement of State law."' 06 Over a decade later, in 2006, the Court reaffirmed a broad reading of section 401 in S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Boardof
0
Environmental Protection.o'
In that case, the Court held that a state may impose certain stream flow requirements on the relicensing of a hydroelectric dam
because the common understanding of "discharge" includes releases from dams,
thereby invoking the certification provision.10s
While many of the lawsuits concerning section 401 certification have involved hydropower facilities, states increasingly are also invoking this same provision of the CWA to protect their waterways from a wider array of federal
projects. These water quality impacts include "inadequate river flow, inundation
of habitat, dissolved oxygen levels, and impacts on fish and other wildlife."o9
For instance, in 2009, in AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v. Wilson,"o the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Maryland's denial of section
401 water quality certification for a proposed LNG export terminal"' adjacent
102. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)); see also CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., 97-488, CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 401: BACKGROUND AND ISSUEs 2-3 (2015).
103. See S.D. Warren Co., 547 U.S. at 380; see also COPELAND, supra note 102, at 3.

104. 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
105. Id. at 703.
106. Id. at 711; see also Debra L. Donahue, The UntappedPower of Clean WaterAct Section 401, 23
ECOLOGY L.Q 201, 213-14 (1996).
107. 547 U.S. at 373.
108. Id. at 373.
109. COPELAND, supra note 102, at 1.
110. 589 F.3d 721 (4th Cit. 2009).
111. To transport natural gas across water, it must be cooled to liquid form at an LNG facility
before it is containerized for ocean transport by ship. An LNG export facility cools the gas to
liquid form and facilitates ocean transport, and an import facility at the destination heats the
LNG back into a gas for transport by pipeline to end users. See Liquefied Natural Gas, U.S.
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to Baltimore Harbor on four independent bases, including the effects of deep
channel dredging on the state's water quality, was not arbitrary and capricious.1 1 2 Likewise, in 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld Connecticut's denial of water quality certification for the proposed Islander East natural gas pipeline. Although two years earlier the court had found
the state's basis for denial arbitrary and capricious," 3 following remand to the
state agency, the Second Circuit found that the state's subsequent analysis of
the project's drilling impacts on the state's water quality supported the state's
denial of water quality certification.11 4 In light of these Supreme Court and
circuit court decisions, section 401 of the CWA has proven to be an effective
veto power for states over projects like hydropower facilities, LNG facilities,
and interstate natural gas pipelines, even where the federal government otherwise has primary authority over the siting and approval process.
Beyond the CWA, Congress also gave states a role in protecting coastal
natural resources from harm from federally approved projects through the
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. The Act sought to strike a balance
between development and preservation interests of the coast and its valuable
resources"' based upon an understanding of coastal areas as unique environmental zones, which require special protections given their significance as natural resources." 6 The purpose of the Act was "'to enhance state authority by
encouraging and assisting the states to assume planning and regulatory powers
over their coastal zones,' with 'no attempt to diminish state authority through
federal preemption.'""' Both the language and legislative history of the Act
explicitly deny any congressional attempt within the legislation to pre-empt
state regulation of such areas."' However, Congress was not seeking to broaden
state authority without purpose; rather, given the inadequacy of local coastal
DEP'T OF ENERGY, https://perma.cc/6AFD-S9QI; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., GROWTH
IN DOMESTIC NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION LEADS To DEVELOPMENT OF LNG EXPORT
TERMINALS (2016) (discussing LNG and LNG terminals).

112. AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC, 589 F.3d at 723, 733.
113. See Islander E. Pipeline Co., LLC v. Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 482 F.3d 79, 95, 105 (2d
Cir. 2006).
114. See Islander E. Pipeline Co., LLC v. McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2008).
115. FRANK P. GRAD, 5-10 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 10.04(2)(b) (2016); see also
Martin J. LaLonde, Allocating the Burden of Proofto Effectuate the Preservation and Federalism
Goals of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 92 MICH. L. REV. 438, 438 (1993).
116. Bruce Kuhse, The Federal Consistency Requirements of the Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972: It's Time to Repeal This Fundamentally Flawed Legislation, 6 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J.
77, 78-79 (2001) (noting the term "coastal zone" allegedly first appeared in the 1969 Stratton Commission report, "Our Nation and the Sea").

117. Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 60 (2011) (quoting S. REP. No.
92-753, at 1 (1972)).
118. Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 593 (1987).
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zone regulation at the time, Congress hoped to encourage local and state governments to more effectively protect these valuable regions."'9
While state participation under the Coastal Zone Management Act is voluntary, Congress sought to encourage state protection of their coastal zones by
allocating grant finding to states instituting coastal management programs that
meet federal guidelines as well as funding for the implementation of approved
programs.1 20 States with federally approved coastal zone management plans may
deny or impose conditions upon permits for projects affecting their coastal
zones (land, water, or natural resources).121 Projects requiring federal permits
that would alter a state's coastal zone generally must obtain certification from
the state, which verifies that the project is "consistent" with the state's federally
approved coastal zone management plan.1 22 However, the state does not have
the same type of "veto" authority under the Coastal Zone Management Act
that it does under the CWA. Instead, the Secretary of Commerce may determine that the proposed "activity is consistent with the objectives" of an approved state coastal management program or "is otherwise necessary in the
interest of national security" and issue the requested federal permit without the
state's concurring certification, or the Secretary may even request the President
grant an exemption for the project.'23 Thus, there is a widespread understanding that states lack veto power under the Coastal Zone Management Act, even
when determining that a federal activity will hinder the state's coastal region.12 4
Indeed, the legislative history behind the Act's current consistency provision
(amended in 1990 following a Supreme Court decision that Congress believed
unfavorably narrowed the consistency requirement that federal activities align
with a state's federally approved coastal management plan) includes numerous
statements from members of Congress indicating that Congress did not perceive the Coastal Zone Management Act as granting states veto power over
federal projects .125
States have used their authority under the Coastal Zone Management Act,
often in conjunction with section 401 of the CWA, to attempt to block the
development of natural gas facilities by refusing to issue a consistency certificate
119. Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 393 (3d Cir. 1987).
120. GRAD, supra note 115.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

MURRILL, supra note 27, at 19.

Ryan, supra note 117, at 59.
Id. at 61; MURRILL, supra note 27, at 19.
LaLonde, supra note 115, at 454.
Id. at 442-43, 454 & n.88 (citing 136 CONG. REc. H8080 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Panetta) (Section 307(c)(1) "does not give the State a veto power."); 136
CONG. REc. H8101 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) (It has been
"asserted that the original amendment creates a veto authority. It does not."); 136 CONG.
REc. E543 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1990) (statement of Rep. Jones) (Section 307(c)(1) "will not
result in the veto of vital national projects or activities.")).
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to proposed projects. Indeed, in the 2006 Islander East case discussed above,
Connecticut also rejected the proposed pipeline as inconsistent with its coastal
management plan.1 26 Islander East responded to this denial by requesting that
the Secretary of Commerce override Connecticut's decision, which the Secretary did.127 Although the federal district court determined that the Secretary's
decision was arbitrary and capricious,1 28 the second IslanderEast decision in the
Second Circuit did not address this dispute, and instead the project was
stopped based on the court's approval of the state's CWA certification denial."9
In sum, the Coastal Zone Management Act preserves a strong role for state
environmental permits and regulation so long as the state's required measures
do not conflict with federal law. Though the statute proffers a mechanism for
resisting a natural gas pipeline facility, it is less forceful than the ability of a
state to issue an outright veto over a federal project under section 401 CWA
authority.
Although the CWA and the Coastal Zone Management Act focus on
water resources, states also have federal authority to protect state air resources
against a variety of energy projects. Under the CAA, natural gas projects must
obtain federal and state permits for compressor stations and other natural gas
transport infrastructure." 0 Compressor stations, which are generally placed
every forty to one hundred miles along the route of a pipeline, are necessary to
maintain the required pressurization of natural gas within pipelines so that the
gas may travel from the gathering facility to the processing facility."' These
compressor stations emit various air pollutants, such as "volatile organic compounds; particulate matter; nitrogen oxides; carbon monoxide; sulfur dioxide;
greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide); and small
amounts of hazardous air pollutants (e.g., benzene, acetaldehyde, formalde-

126. Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 482 F.3d 79, 86 n.6 (2d Cir. 2006).
127. Id.
128. Connecticut v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, No. 3:04cv1271, 2007 WL 2349894, at *16 (D.
Conn. Aug. 15, 2007).
129. Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141, 164 (2d Cir. 2008).
130. See RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AN OVERVIEW OF AIR QUALITY
IsSUES IN NATURAL GAS SYSTEMS 2, 7 (2016) (noting that daily administration of the

CAA, including permitting activities, has primarily been designated to local governments
within states); JAMES E. MCCARTHY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLEAN AIR ACT:
A SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 15 (2011); Steven H. Lord, Jr.,
Aggregation Consternation:Clean Air Act Source Determination Issues in the Oil and Gas Patch,
29 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 645, 647 (2012); Michael K. Reer, Bursting the Bubhle: Moving
Toward "The Common Sense Principle"When ConsideringAir Aggregation of Oil and Gas Facilities, 26 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 61, 69 (2015).
131. Reer, supra note 130; The Transportation of Natural Gas, NATURALGAS.ORG,
http://perma.cc/7BTX-N5GD.
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hyde, toluene, ethyl benzene and xylenes)."1 3 2As discussed in Part I, the Natural Gas Act savings clause protects states' rights to protect air quality under the
CAA in addition to their rights to protect water and coastal zone resources.133
With the rapid construction and expansion of natural gas facilities due to the
hydraulic fracturing boom, individuals and interest groups opposed to natural
gas development projects have frequently opposed the air quality emissions associated with compressor stations.13 4
Some opposition groups have even advocated that state or local governments deny air quality emission permits required for individual compressor stations in an attempt to thwart entire pipeline projects by preventing construction
of the necessary compressor stations. For instance, opponents of the Constitution Pipeline urged the New York Department of Environmental Conservation
to deny permits for a compressor station in an attempt to prevent construction
of the pipeline. 3 s Citizen groups have also formed in efforts to rescind compressor station air quality permits that regulators in other states have already
issued.'36 In 2016, some Massachusetts residents hostile to the expansion of an
existing pipeline indicated that they saw that their best chance to defeat the
overall development would be to convince state regulators to deny the required
state permits for a new compressor station necessary for the expansion.' The
opposition group had argued that the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection should deny the proposed compressor station due to harmful
emissions and the possibility of an explosion. 3 s Although states have yet to be
132. OHIO ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIR POLLUTION CONTROL PERMITS FOR NATURAL GAS
COMPRESSOR STATIONS 3 (2016).

133. Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty., Inc. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1315 (D.C. Cir.
2015); supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
134. See Elizabeth Shogren, Air Quality Concerns Threaten Natural Gas's Image, NPR (June 21,

2011), http://perma.cc/8MDJ-JN8B (describing air pollution problems that have accompanied the recent development of natural gas as an increasingly-exploited energy source in the

United States).
135. Joe Mahoney, Pipeline Opponents Target Permitfor Compressor Station, DAILY STAR (Dec. 5,

2014), http://perma.cc/H9XA-ANNC.
136. See Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty., Inc., 783 F.3d at 1306, 1319-20 (arguing that, in
the context of a state-approved compressor station, FERC improperly hampered the state's
rights under the CAA by conditionally certifying the project prior to state authorization);

Citizens for Pa.'s Future v. Ultra Res., Inc., 898 F. Supp. 2d 741, 742, 744 (M.D. Pa. 2012)
(plaintiffs alleging purported violations of the CAA 'due to nitrogen oxide emissions from
seven operating compressor stations).
137. See Christian Schiavone, Weymouth Compressor Station Opponents Plan Big Presence at State
Permit Hearing, PATRIOT LEDGER (Mar. 23, 2016), http://perma.cc/438B-XZWR.
138. Id.; see also Fred Hanson, State Agency ProposesExtension for Review of Weymouth Compressor
Station, PATRIOT LEDGER (Aug. 5, 2016), http://perma.cc/AXD3-WC5R (reporting that

the state coastal zone management agency would delay review and decision on the project
until the project obtained a required permit from the state department of environmental

protection).
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as active in opposing federal energy projects using their authority under the
CAA as they have under the CWA and Coastal Zone Management Act, it
appears likely that the opposition to permitting for new natural gas compressor
stations will continue as one item in the state toolbox to fight natural gas
developments.
B.

Energy Security Concerns and the Energy Policy Act of 2005

Fast forward to 2005 when Congress enacted the first comprehensive energy policy legislation in over a decade. That law-EPAct 2005-arose out of
the nation's significant energy security concerns over the vulnerability of the
nation's energy supplies, supporting infrastructure, and reliability. The 2003
blackouts-where a single power line outage caused by falling trees had a devastating, cascading effect that left approximately 50 million people without
power throughout the Northeast and Midwest-called into question the reliability of the nation's transmission grid.1 39 Also in 2005, domestic oil and gas
supplies were low, resulting in both high fuel prices and increasing dependence
on foreign sources of oil and gas, leading to additional energy security concerns.1 40 The provisions of EPAct 2005 were designed to respond to these concerns by increasing and diversifying a wide range of energy supplies, promoting
energy efficiency, and improving the interstate energy transport system.1 4 1 In
his signing statement for EPAct 2005, President George W. Bush stated that
the legislation "promotes dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound
production and distribution of energy for America's future."1 42
EPAct 2005 as a whole reflects very different national concerns than those
contained in the CWA, the Coastal Zone Management Act, and other 1970s
federal legislation that had imposed new, significant environmental protection
conditions on energy development. EPAct 2005 was all about producing more
domestic energy (both renewable energy and fossil fuels); using those resources
more efficiently and effectively, and improving the transportation, distribution,
and security of these energy resources. Thus, unlike the 1970s legislation, which
granted states a greater voice in energy-related decisions that could adversely
impact their land, water, and resources, EPAct 2005 shifted back to aug139. See, e.g., DAVIES ET AL., supra note 45, at 461; Debbie Swanstrom & Meredith M. Jolivert,
DOE Transmission CorridorDesignations & FERC Backstop Siting Authority: Has the Energy
PolicyAct of2005 Succeeded in Stimulating the Development ofNew Transmission Facilities?, 30
ENERGY L.J. 415, 423 (2009); JR Minkel, The 2003 Northeast Blackout-Five Years Later,
Sci. Aw. (Aug. 13, 2008), https://perma.cc/GUK8-YSRG.
140. Swanstrom &Jolivert, supra note 139, at 422 (citing S. REP. No. 109-78, at 6, 8 (2005);
H.R. No. 109-215, at 171 (2005)).
141. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 109-78 at 2-6, 9 (2005); H.R. No. 109-215, at 169 (2005)).
142. Statement on Signing the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1315, 1315-16 (Aug.
8, 2005).
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menting federal authority, particularly over energy transport infrastructure, to
reduce barriers states had erected by exercising their new powers granted in the
1970s.
On the energy production side, EPAct 2005 contains provisions that: (1)
mandated the use of large amounts of biofuels in gasoline for the first time to
reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil and spur the development of domestic
biofuels as a substitute; (2) created significant tax incentives for the production
of renewable energy, oil and gas, coal, and nuclear energy as well as new energy
efficiency programs, grants, and incentives; and (3) encouraged greater production of energy on federal lands by reducing royalties for some oil and gas production, increased access to drilling on federal lands, and promoted leasing of
federal lands for geothermal energy.1 43
As for grid reliability, EPAct 2005 authorized FERC to certify a national
electric reliability organization ("ERO") to enforce mandatory reliability standards for the electric grid and impose penalties on public utilities and other grid
operators for non-compliance.144 It also established federal siting and eminent
domain authority for interstate electric transmission lines in some circumstances.14s Referred to colloquially as "backstop siting authority," section 1221
of EPAct 2005 directed DOE to study electric transmission congestion every
three years and, if warranted, designate certain transmission corridors with congestion problems as "national interest electric transmission corridors"
("NIETCs").146 This process was designed to facilitate a partnership between
DOE and FERC in deciding when preemption of state siting laws is appropriate: once DOE designated a NIETC, FERC was authorized to issue construction permits for lines designed to ease congestion if states did not authorize the
lines under certain circumstances.1 47 Notably, states still retained the primary
authority regarding the siting of transmission lines, and any FERC preemption
of state siting was characterized as a "backstop" to dysfunctional state siting
processes.
Initially, many experts believed that section 1221 would create major inroads into state primacy for interstate electric transmission line siting. The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners ("NARUC") and the
National Governors Association vehemently opposed any transfer of even limited siting and eminent domain authority for interstate transmission lines from
the states to the federal government, arguing that states were in a much better
position to consider concerns of affected citizens and businesses with regard to
143. See, e.g., MARK HOLT & CAROL GLOVER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33302, ENERGY
POLICY ACT OF 2005: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF ENACTED PROVISIONS 1-5 (2006).

144. See id. at 1.
145. See id. at 2.
146. See 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a) (2012); Swanstrom &Jolivert, supra note 139, at 422.
147. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b).
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the costs and physical impact of new transmission lines.1 48 These and other
interests opposed to any additional federal transmission line siting authority
also made efforts in later years to repeal section 1221.149
Though these interest groups were unable to legislatively block or repeal
section 1221, two federal circuit courts eventually endorsed a very limited view
of federal authority over transmission siting-rendering section 1221 effectively
inert. A decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected
FERC's "expansive" interpretation of section 1221 in adopting its backstop
transmission siting regulations.s0 The Court reasoned that the clear language
of the statute only allowed FERC to preempt a state if the state affirmatively
withheld approval of a transmission line siting permit for more than a year, but
not (as FERC's rules provided) if a state regulator denied an application.''
After a decision finding that DOE did not adequately consult with states in
designating the first NIETC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
148. See, e.g., The Energy Policy Act of 2005: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air
Quality of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Energy
Policy Act of 2005 Hearings] (statement of Hon. Marilyn Showalter, President, NARUC)
(stating that "NARUC is strongly opposed to any role (direct or backstop) for FERC in
authorizing or siting transmission lines," that there is no evidence, beyond anecdotes, that
states have prevented needed transmission projects, and that states "are better positioned to
identify and evaluate alternatives to a specific project" and to "consider comments from affected citizens and businesses"); id. at 227 (statement of Frank M. Murkowski, Chairman,
Nat. Res. Comm., Nat'l Governors Ass'n) (noting that federal agencies often interfere with
transmission lines that cross federal lands or impact federal resources, that preempting state
law would not necessarily expedite the siting process as a result of already slow federal
processes by federal land management agencies, that neighbors, communities, environmental
groups, and others are typical intervenors in transmission line projects, and that "[slince the
costs of a transmission project often fall on consumers who have no direct say in whether
they want to pay those costs, regulators and siting authorities must weigh very carefully their
responsibility for passing along construction costs to people who will not benefit").
149. See National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors:Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy ofthe H Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 62-65 (2007) (testimony of Hon. H. William DeWeese, Majority Leader, Pennsylvania House of
Representatives) (arguing in favor of repealing section 1221 and stating that "[i]f the FERC
is permitted to use its congressionally conveyed authority to commandeer and usurp the
traditional role of states and their administrative agencies to review and approve the location
and construction of high voltage transmission lines, Pennsylvania, not unlike every other
state, would have no control, no say, and no recourse other than expensive litigation; over
transmission planning, location, and construction within its geographic borders"); id. at 15
(testimony of Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight and Govt Reform)
(criticizing the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and particularly section 1221, stating that
"[r]ather than being respectful of the traditional federal-state relationship, the Energy Policy
Act trampled on it by creating a legal mechanism for energy companies to end-run the states
and get practically any transmission project-no matter how ill-considered-approved here
in Washington, D.C.").
150. See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 309-10 (4th Cir. 2009).
151. See id.
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also sent federal regulators back to the drawing board in implementing section
1221.152 Since that time, DOE has not designated any additional NIETQs, and
FERC has not attempted to exercise backstop siting authority or propose any
new rules to facilitate it.
While these federal decisions focused on detailed procedural requirements
Congress had included in section 1221, both majority opinions seemed somewhat dismissive of core legislative purposes related to EPAct 2005. Notably,
Judge Traxler partially dissented from the Fourth Circuit decision, disputing
the clarity of the statutory provision used by the Fourth Circuit to reject
FERC's backstop transmission siting rules based on extensive legislative history."s' He detailed the concerns Congress had expressed regarding the reliability of the grid leading up to the enactment of section 1221, the inability of
states to site necessary interstate transmission lines, and why a more significant
federal role was needed to address these reliability concerns, particularly in light
of the 2003 blackout.15 4 This legislative history included DOE reports and congressional statements warning that the grid had evolved since the enactment,of
the Federal Power Act in 1935 from a local grid to multistate, regional grids;
that construction of new transmission lines was not keeping up with electricity
demand as a result of state permitting bottlenecks; and that these deficiencies,
in part as a result of the lack of federal siting and eminent domain authority for
key interstate electric transmission lines, had resulted in higher consumer electricity costs and blackouts.15 s
Finally, another provision of EPAct 2005 relating to grid reliability-section 1222-received little attention at the time of its enactment (at least as
compared to section 1221 backstop siting authority) but, as discussed below,
may yet play a role in a new balance of federalism in the electric grid context.
Section 1222 of EPAct 2005 grants authority to two federal PMAs covering
multiple states in the West and Southwest-WAPA and SWPA-to design,
construct, or operate a new electric power transmission project within any state
in which they operate if DOE determines the project will reduce congestion of
electricity transmission, is needed to accommodate increased electric transmis152. Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011).
153. See Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d at 320, 325-26 (Traxler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL TRANSMSSION GRID STUDY 58-59 (2002);
Energy Policy Act of2005 Hearings,supra note 148, at 25-28 (statement of Cynthia A. Marlette, General Counsel, FERC); 150 CONG. REc. S3732 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 2004) (statement
of Sen. Domenici) ("To avoid future blackouts and provide our industry and consumers with
the reliable electricity they need, we need to invest in critical transmission infrastructure;
provide limited Federal siting of transmission lines to ensure the transmission of national
interest lines, and avoid the most significant areas where we had gridlock; streamline the
permitting of siting for transmission lines to assure adequate transmission. ... We need all
these parts of the Energy bill.").
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sion capacity, and meets other requirements.1 6 The legislation authorizes
WAPA and SWPA to act alone or to partner with other entities to design,
construct, or operate a transmission project that meets the statutory criteria.'
Thus, this provision provided the potential for WAPA and SWPA to step in
and authorize a private transmission line project meeting these requirements
even if a state had denied a siting permit or the exercise of eminent domain.'s
The limited legislative history for section 1222 focused on the past need for
special legislation for each private-public collaboration on a transmission line
project and that the new law would allow such partnerships as a general matter
within WAPA and SWPA for projects that meet the statute's requirements.' 59
DOE utilized this provision for the first time in 2016, when it authorized the
Plains & Eastern Clean Line as discussed in more detail below, see infra Part
I1.D.
As for natural gas infrastructure, in EPAct 2005, Congress created several
new provisions to streamline the construction of new infrastructure by increasing federal authority over natural gas facilities and significantly limiting state
authority. With regard to natural gas pipelines, section 313(b) of EPAct 2005
amended section 19 of the Natural Gas Act to provide that the U.S. court of
appeals for the circuit in which an interstate natural gas pipeline or LNG terminal is proposed to be constructed, expanded, or operated shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action to review certain orders or actions.16 0 These include orders or actions by a federal agency other than FERC,
or a state administrative agency acting pursuant to federal law, to issue any
condition or deny any permit, license, concurrence, or approval under federal
law other than the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.161 Thus, this jurisdictional provision expressly applies to actions taken by states to impose additional conditions on FERC-approved natural gas facilities under the CWA and
the CAA.1 6 2 The legislative history associated with this provision indicates it
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 16421(a) (2012).
157. Id. § 161421(b).
158. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing cases finding no state permit or eminent
domain required for transmission line projects authorized by PMAs based on the Supremacy
Clause).
159. See HOLT & GLOVER, supra note 143, at 76-77 ("Before enactment [of section 1222], the
enabling statutes for power marketing administrations could have restricted third-party financing, construction, operation, and maintenance of transmission facilities.") (citing 16
U.S.C. § 460 (2012) (SWPA) and 43 U.S.C. § 485 (2012) (WAPA)).
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 717r (2012); MURRILL, supra note 27, at 4-5; Islander E. Pipeline Co. v.
McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141, 148-49 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing judicial review amendments).
161. See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1).
162. See MURRILL, supra note 27, at 4-5. Although states also have authority to place conditions
on natural gas facilities under the Coastal Zone Management Act, that law is subject to a
separate administrative review process through the U.S. Department of Commerce and thus
is not subject to these appeal provisions. See id.
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was prompted by concerns that applicants for interstate natural gas pipeline
certificates "were encountering difficulty proceeding with natural gas projects
that depended on obtaining state agency permits."'6 3 According to the Director
of the Office of Energy Projects at FERC, natural gas pipeline projects were
subject to "a series of sequential administrative and State court and Federal
court appeals that [could] kill a project with a death by a thousand cuts just in
terms of the time frames associated with going through all those appeal
processes."16 4
The other provision of EPAct 2005 that related to natural gas infrastructure was section 311, which amended the Natural Gas Act to confirm exclusive
siting authority with FERC for LNG import and export terminals.165 Prior to
EPAct 2005, some states had attempted to block LNG facilities and had argued that they had veto power over any FERC approval of such facilities.' 6
Congress clarified federal siting authority for LNG terminals in response to
increasing concerns in the early 2000s that the United States would soon face a
natural gas shortage based on diminishing domestic supplies coupled with recent state denials of permits for LNG facilities to import supplies from overseas. Of course, in 2007, soon after the enactment of EPAct 2005, the fracking
revolution began and these concerns, at least for now, became moot. Nevertheless, section 311 was used to site several new import terminals in 2006 and 2007
and, in the years since then, to site several new export terminals to facilitate the
sales of the new sources of U.S. natural gas overseas.
Taken together, these EPAct 2005 provisions represented an effort to increase federal authority to expedite the approval of interstate natural gas and
electricity infrastructure based on concerns over energy security and infrastructure reliability. There was a clear sentiment in Congress by 2005 that the states
were standing in the way of the nation's energy needs. Nevertheless, despite
EPAct 2005, states retained enough authority to create roadblocks and delays
for federal natural gas pipeline projects and LNG terminals under the savings
clause in EPAct 2005 discussed earlier, particularly when the fracking boom
prompted a significant increase in the number of these projects.' 7 Likewise,
despite EPAct 2005, the federal government still had very limited authority
over interstate electric transmission line projects (particularly after adverse court
decisions). Thus, as time went on, federal agencies had growing incentives to
163. Islander E. Pipeline Co., LLC v. Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 482 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir.
2006) (citing legislative history to explain new federal appeals process for state Clean Water
Act certification denials).
164. Id.
165. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 311, 119 Stat. 594, 685-88 (2005);
Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717.
166. For discussion, see generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Environmental Regulation, Energy and
Market Entry, 15 DUKE ENvrL. L. & POL'Y F. 167 (2005).
167. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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use what existing authority they had to "override" state siting decisions perceived as harming national goals of facilitating the efficient delivery of the nation's electric energy and states had similar incentives to push back against
natural gas pipeline projects perceived as having adverse environmental impacts
on the states. The following sections highlight two examples of these "federalism battles."
C.

Contemporary State Pressures on Natural Gas Pipeline Siting: The Fracking
Boom, Natural Gas InfrastructureExpansion,
and the -Constitution Pipeline

Since the fracking boom, pipeline siting has become a central battleground
for environmental groups concerned with the nation's continued dependence on
fossil fuels and the impact of this dependence on global climate change. The
highest profile examples of this, of course, are the Keystone XL and Dakota
Access oil pipelines, which the Obama Administration blocked but the Trump
Administration revived.16 For its part, natural gas is a low-carbon fossil fuel,
especially when compared to coal or oil, but it is hardly exempt from opposition
from environmental groups and local communities as a result of concerns associated with methane leaks, earthquakes, water pollution, and other environmental and land use issues. Indeed, over the past two years, it has become
routine for almost every major gas pipeline approval by FERC to engender high
visibility political protests.169
In December 2014, FERC issued an order granting a certificate to construct the $683 million Constitution Pipeline project and a related transfer
compressor station."0 This 124-mile, 30-inch diameter pipeline would extend
from a natural gas-rich area of Pennsylvania to Schoharie, New York, where it
would interconnect with the proposed Wright Compressor Station."'x In issuing the certificate FERC concluded the benefits that "the Constitution Pipeline
Project and the Wright Interconnection Project will provide to the market outweigh any adverse effects on existing shippers, other pipelines and their captive
customers, and on landowners and surrounding communities." 72 In its environmental review for the project, FERC acknowledged that "the projects will result
168. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing both pipelines).
169. Cf Michael R. Pincus, FERC Pipeline Siting Program Deals with Legal Challenges, 30 NAT.
REs. & ENV'T 44, 44 (2016) ("FERC is almost under constant fire from environmental
groups and landowners that oppose the construction of new or expanded pipelines . . . .");
Susan Phillips, Pipeline Opponents Target FERC in a Week ofActions, STATE IMPACT PA.
(May 17, 2016), https://perma.cc/2WPA-GSJL; Hannah Northey, PublicBarredfrom Meeting as Protests Loom, E&E NEws (May 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/D87Q-EGEX.
170. Constitution Pipeline Co., LLC, 149 FERC ¶ 61,199 (2014); CONsTITUION PIPELINE,
https://perma.cc/Z42V-27AV (discussing the cost of the project).
171. CONSTITUTION PIPELINE, supra note 170.
172. Constitution Pipeline Co., LLC, 149 FERC at 62,203.
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in some adverse environmental impacts," but concluded that proposed mitigation efforts as well as FERC staff recommendations (adopted as conditions to
the approval of the pipeline and compressor station) reduced these impacts to
"less-than-significant" levels." FERC received numerous comments in support
of the projects, asserting that they would bring jobs to the area. A variety of
private environmental organizations had requested an evidentiary hearing
before FERC to address their concerns in the certificate proceeding, but FERC
denied their requests.17 4
FERC's environmental review process for the proposed pipeline and compressor station lasted more than two years.' The agency held scoping meetings
in New York and Pennsylvania in late 2012 featuring more than 100 speakers,
and received more than 750 letters from interested stakeholders regarding the
project, including federal, state, and local agencies. 7' A variety of environmental issues were addressed in the review, including the impacts of the pipeline's
construction and operation on New York's geology, water bodies, wetlands, forests, migratory birds, bats, property values, and public safety, as well as induced
development of natural gas production, cumulative impacts, and alternatives. 7 7
New York environmental regulators participated in these proceedings, and as
part of their ongoing interactions with state regulators regarding impacts on
water, Constitution agreed to route part of the pipeline to a different location.17 1 In approving Constitution's certificate, FERC noted specifically that
"impacts on waterbodies and wetlands will be further mitigated by Constitution's compliance with the conditions of the [Army Corps of Engineers section
404 wetlands permits] and the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation's (NYSDEC) section 401 permits required under the CWA (including compensatory mitigation)."1'7 In addition to relocating part of the project,"' as a condition to the certificate approval, Constitution agreed to fund
$18 million for wetland mitigation and banking, as well as approximately $8.6
million for the restoration and preservation of migratory bird habitats."'
In issuing its certificate, FERC included standard boilerplate language to
the effect that "[any state or local permits issued with respect to the jurisdictional facilities authorized herein must be consistent with the conditions of this
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 62,213.
Id. at 62,205.
Id. at 62,216.
Id.
Id. at 62,218.
See New Marcellus Constitution Pipeline Announce "Final"Route, MARCELLUS DRILLING
NEWS (Jan. 21, 2013), https://perma.cc/5EGT-X5FT.
179. Constitution Pipeline Co., LLC, 149 FERC ¶ 62,214 (2014).
180. See New Marcellus Constitution PipelineAnnounce "Final"Route, supra note 178.
181. See Constitution Pipeline Refsed Water Permit by New York Regulator, SIALE GAs INTL
(Apr. 27, 2016), http://perma.cc/2F5Z-ZD7L.
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certificate."182 While FERC encouraged cooperation between interstate pipelines and local officials, it also stated, "this does not mean that state and local
agencies, through application of state or local laws, may prohibit or unreasonably delay the construction or operation of facilities approved by this Commission."' In August 2016, New York environmental regulators did not request
rehearing of this FERC order approving the routing of the Constitution pipeline, nor did they appeal it.184

Although the pipeline was initially expected to be in service by 2015, on
Earth Day 2016, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation
refused to issue a permit for Constitution's project under section 401 of the
CWA on the grounds that the project did not comply with New York's water
quality standards."'s In rejecting Constitution's application' 6 New York raised
particular concerns with cutting of trees near streams and directly on banks of
streams, resulting in potential damming. It also mentioned that New York had
filed comments during FERC's environmental review process requesting additional information (in concurrence with comments filed by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers) and proposing alternative routing of the pipeline along I8.187 New York noted that it "repeatedly asked Constitution to analyze alternative routes that could have avoided or minimized impacts to an extensive group
of water resources, as well as to address other potential impacts to these resources," but Constitution failed to "substantively" address these concerns."' In
addition, New York highlighted "cumulative negative effects" of multiple
stream crossings with the proposed pipeline."' New York did not hold a hearing prior to issuing the letter, but the letter provided Constitution an opportu-

182. Constitution Pipeline LLC, 149 FERC at 62,224.
183. Id. (citing Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988); Nat'l Fuel Gas Supply
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 894 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1990); Iroquois Gas Transmission Sys., L.P.,
59 FERC ¶ 61,094 (1992); Iroquois Gas Transmission Sys., L.P., 52 FERC ¶ 61,091
(1990)).
184. A party who is dissatisfied with FERC's decision can seek rehearing. See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(a)
(2012); see also Corpus Christi Liquefaction, LLC, Cheniere Corpus Christi Pipeline, L.P.,
151 FERC ¶ 61,098, 61,651 (2015). If rehearing is unsuccessful, an affected party can seek
judicial review. See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(a).
185. The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation's concerns with issuing a
permit are outlined in a letter. Letter from John Ferguson, Chief Permit Adm'r, to Linda
Schubring, Envtl. Project Manager (Apr. 22, 2016), http://perma.cc/R7ZT-YBAU [hereinafter N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Letter].
186. Constitution jointly filed its application with the Army Corps of Engineers, which remained
pending at the time the New York Department of Environmental Conservation issued its
letter.
187. N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conserv. Letter, supra note 185, at 2.
188. Id. at 3.
189. Id.
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nity to either request a hearing or to reapply for a water quality certificate
application.190
While New York's denial of water quality certification for the Constitution pipeline does not cite climate change concerns as a reason for the decision,
the denial does note that climate change will likely exacerbate certain environmental and safety risks associated with the proposed pipeline.' During his
time in office, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo has identified addressing
climate change as one of his administration's most important legacies, and he
has accordingly implemented numerous clean energy initiatives,19 2 including
banning fracking statewide in 2014-to the surprise of many environmentalists.'93 Thus, the Cuomo administration's rejection of the Constitution Pipeline
on narrow water quality grounds was viewed by some as more than merely the
denial of a single natural gas pipeline due to aquatic concerns, but instead as a
calculated decision to embrace another vital weapon in the larger realm of state
power in combatting climate change and championing clean energy initiatives.19 4 Notably, Constitution Pipeline alleges in a legal challenge to the decision that while the New York Department of Environmental Conservation had
drafted and was ready to issue the section 401 certification for the project in
August 2015, the Governor's office halted issuance of the permit."'s Although it
remains to be seen how influential this decision will be both within New York
and beyond, the denial has energized many clean energy proponents and even
190. Id. at 14.
191. Id. at 13 (stating that the dangers associated with improper pipeline depth from high water
flow activity require considerable retroactive efforts to address and that "flooding conditions
from extreme precipitation events are projected to increase on the operational span of the
pipeline due to climate change").
192. See STATE OF NEW YORK, REFORMING THE ENERGY VisION: REV, STATE OF NEW
YORK (2015), https://perma.cc/P892-46M5; STATE OF NEW YORK, REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION: CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD (2016), https://perma.cc/ULU4-7FAV.
193. Scott Waldman, With Initiatives, Cuomo Moves to Solidefy Climate Credentials, POLITICO

(Jan. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/4CAA-3LNX.
194. Scott Waldman, Cuomo Administration Rejects Constitution Pipeline, POLITIcO (Apr. 22,

2016), https://perma.cc/DPJ6-9G52 (quoting Roger Downs, conservation director of the
Atlantic Chapter of the Sierra Club, who declared that the denial of the Constitution Pipeline "represents a turning of the tide, where states across the nation that have been pressured
into accepting harmful gas infrastructure projects by the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-

mission may now feel emboldened to push back.").
195. Complaint at 22, Constitution Pipeline Co. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, No.
1:16-CV-0568 (N.D.N.Y. May 16, 2016). Constitution has challenged the denial of water
quality certification in both the Second Circuit (on the merits) and in federal district court
(on grounds that the Natural Gas Act preempts New York's requirement that Constitution

obtain water quality permits beyond those associated with section 401 of the Clean Water
Act). See Hunton & Williams LLP, Constitution Pipeline Cases Reflect Tension in States' Roles
in Permitting Natural Gas Projects, PIPELINELAW.cOM (Aug. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/

2DDJ-32ZA (discussing the basis for each lawsuit).
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spurred members of the New York State Assembly to urge Governor Cuomo to
"impose a statewide moratorium on granting permits, water quality certifications or other regulatory approvals for transmission pipelines, power generating
plants, compressor stations and fossil fuel projects that are environmental
hazards and would perpetuate New York's dependence on burning natural gas,
coal and oil for energy generation."' 96
Moreover, New York's action came at a time when both DOE and FERC
were under pressure from EPA and others to evaluate "upstream and downstream" impacts of natural gas exports and infrastructure, including upstream
and downstream climate change impacts, in their review of natural gas export
decisions, LNG terminals, and pipelines."' Indeed, in October 2016, EPA
publically criticized FERC for failure to evaluate the upstream and downstream
climate impacts associated with an interstate natural gas pipeline proposed to
run 160 miles through production areas in Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia,
and Kentucky.' 8 Although this pressure on FERC from EPA is very unlikely
to continue during the Trump Administration, states and environmental groups
will continue to urge FERC to expand its environmental review of these
projects to include climate impacts, both in future FERC proceedings and in
the courts. A pending appeal of FERC's certificate order on the Constitution
Pipeline to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit will provide a
further opportunity to clarify the application of the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA") to FERC's pipeline certificate proceedings. In its briefs,
196. Letter from Barbara Lifton et al., Assembly Members of the N.Y. State Assembly, to Honorable Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor of New York (July 7, 2016), http://perma.cc/f4V2-

XF7H.
197. See Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions:
The ProperScope ofNEPA Review, 41 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 109 (2017); Keith Goldberg,
EPA Urges FERC to Review Climate Impacts in LNG Reviews, LAw360 (Jan. 20, 2016),
http://perma.cc/5WGE-9KGU; see also EarthReports, Inc. v. FERC, 828 F.3d 949, 955-56
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that FERC was not required to consider indirect effects, including climate impacts, of increased natural gas exports as part of its environmental review
associated with approving the conservation of Cove Point LNG facility in Maryland from an
import terminal to an export terminal); Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 36, 47 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (describing a similar analysis with regard to approval of LNG facility in Texas). In
August 2016, the Obama Administration's Council on Environmental Quality issued a guidance document directing FERC to consider climate impacts associated with pipeline siting
in NEPA review. See Susan Phillips, Ohama Instructs FERC to Review Climate Impacts of
Pipelines, STATEIMPAcT (Aug. 3, 2016), http://perma.cc/5L8S-MSQ6.
198. Letter from Kenneth A. Westlake, Chief, NEPA Implementation Section, EPA to
Kimberly D. Bose, Sec'y, FERC (Oct. 11, 2016) (enclosing comments on final environmental impact statement); Hannah Northey, EPA Blasts FERCReviews, Seeks "DefinitiveResolution", ENERGYWIRE (Oct. 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/8SRP-FWNM; see also Hannah
Northey, EPA to FERC: "We Really Need to Talk", GREENWnRE (Oct. 24, 2016),
http://perma.cc/R72E-5YWG (reporting on EPA request to FERC seeking a headquarterslevel discussion "to promote deeper, more comprehensive climate reviews of proposed natural
gas pipelines").
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FERC has taken the position that its approval complied with both NEPA and
the Natural Gas Act and that, in effect, challengers are asking the Second Circuit to engage in de novo review of its approval decision.1 99
The proposed Constitution Pipeline shows how FERC's pipeline approval
process, while often viewed as preempting state law through a consolidated federal regulatory review, falls far short of the simple, integrated process that conventional accounts of siting jurisdiction would suggest. This case study
illustrates how the process does not routinely allow for the vetting of evidence
related to environmental harms, such as water and climate impacts-the kind
of evidence that state regulators may be especially well-equipped to assess in the
context of CWA compliance. While the CWA undoubtedly gives states an
important enforcement role and encourages states to adopt more stringent standards than federal floors, 200 relying entirely on a state assessment of environmental harms seems to be in tension with precedents that give FERC broad
preemptive authority over contrary state and local laws. Nevertheless, FERC
and project proposers may need to think more proactively about how they can
better integrate state environmental concerns into its certificate process so as -to
soften the effect of state veto points over energy infrastructure projects. In addition, as the example of the Constitution Pipeline shows, FERC may need to
improve its assessment of "upstream" impacts associated with the approval of
new pipelines, and it can do so through federal environmental review as part of
the certificate process. Regardless of how federal appellate courts resolve the
pending dispute surrounding pipeline siting between FERC and the states, at
the very minimum it is an oversimplification to suggest that the federal integrated process for pipeline review under the Natural Gas Act provides an efficient and complete assessment of a pipeline's impacts, including the interests of
state and local environmental regulators.
D.

Contemporary FederalPressures on Electric Transmission Line Siting: The
Rise of Wind Energy, New Transmission Line Market Actors,
and The Plains & Eastern Clean Line

As noted earlier in this Part, there have always existed narrow circumstances in which the federal government, rather than a state government, has
authority to approve interstate electric transmission lines. However, for the
most part these provisions rarely applied or were rarely exercised. Yet, by the
early 2000s, pressure was building to integrate more renewable energy into the
electric grid nationwide as a result of growing concerns over the continuing use
199. See Brief for Respondent FERC at 7-10, Catskill Moutainkeeper, Inc. v. FERC, No. 16345 (2d Cir. filed Feb. 5, 2016).
200. See, e.g., Donahue, supra note 106, at 301 (arguing that section 401 serves "to give effect to,
and ensure that federally permitted activities are consistent with, existing state requirements
respecting water quality").
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of fossil fuels; state RPSs mandating that utilities sell more renewable energy to
customers (either by generating it themselves, purchasing it from independent
generators, or purchasing renewable energy credits); dropping costs of wind energy; and opening up of energy generation and transmission markets due to the
congressional legislation and FERC orders discussed in Part I. These pressures
provided an entry point for new transmission actors-most notably merchant
transmission line companies-that saw new business opportunities to build DC
transmission lines 201 to carry wind and other forms of renewable energy to markets. However, as discussed in Part I, even if markets would support these new
transmission actors and projects, their efforts were often stymied by opposition
from incumbent utilities coupled with state laws that either expressly prohibited
non-utility actors from building new transmission lines or were at best unclear
on that issue. 2 02
It was at this time, in 2005, that Congress enacted sections 1221 and 1222
of EPAct 2005, detailed earlier in this Part, to provide a greater role for the
federal government in interstate transmission line siting. As noted earlier, the
courts thwarted FERC and DOE's initial efforts to implement section 1221
and those agencies have been hesitant to try again. As for section 1222, the
provision rested in obscurity until March 2016, when DOE made major news
after it exercised its authority for the first time in approving Clean Line Energy
Partners' Plains & Eastern Clean Line project. Recall from earlier in this Part
that section 1222 granted authority to WAPA and SWPA, working through
DOE, to partner with a private party to design, construct, or operate a transmission project within WAPA and SWPA's geographic footprint on the condition that DOE determined the project would reduce congestion of electricity
transmission, would accommodate increased electric transmission capacity, and
would meet other requirements.203 As part of its implementation of section
1222, DOE issued a request for proposal ("RFP") in 2010 setting forth more
detailed requirements for projects that wished to engage in the types of partnerships the new law authorized.2 0 4 The RFP stated that if the project met the
section 1222 statutory criteria, DOE and the relevant PMA would conduct an
initial evaluation of the project based on an analysis of the following factors:
* whether the project is in the public interest;
201. See supra note 75-76 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between DC and AC
transmission lines).
202. Klass & Rossi, supra note 60, at 189-97.
203. Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 16421(a) (2012).
204. Request for Proposals for New or Upgraded Transmission Line Projects Under Section 1222
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,940 (June 10, 2010) [hereinafter RFP];
see also U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SUMMtARY OF FINDINGS, IN RE APPLICATION OF CLEAN
LINE ENERGY PARTNERS LLC PURSUANT TO SECTION 1222 OF THE ENERGY POLICY
ACT OF 2005, at 3-4 (2016) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SUMMalARY OF FINDINGS]
(discussing RFP).
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* whether the project will facilitate the reliable delivery of power generated by renewable resources;
* an evaluation of the benefits and impacts of the project in each state it
traverses, including economic and environmental factors;
* whether the project is technically viable, considering engineering, electric, and geographic factors; and
* whether the project is financially viable. 205
The RFP also provides additional details on what the agencies want to see in an
application with regard to each of the criteria. 206
Clean Line Energy Partners submitted its section 1222 application to
partner with SWPA in July 2010. As detailed in the March 2016 approval
document, the initial proposal was for two HYDC lines that could deliver
7,000 MW of wind energy from projects in Oklahoma, Kansas, and Texas to
the southeastern United States. 207 Clean Line amended the proposal in January
2015 to seek approval for a single 720-mile 600 kV, HVDC transmission line
capable of delivering 4,000 MW of primarily renewable energy from Oklahoma
and Texas to the southeastern United States with an interconnection to ihe
Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") .20 There would also be a converter station in Arkansas that would allow the line to connect with the MISO transmission system. 20 9 Clean Line would contribute funds totaling $14.1 million for
SWPA to acquire the necessary property rights for the project using federal
eminent domain authority and for environmental review costs and administrative expenses. Clean Line would also pay for and manage all other aspects of
the project.210 Clean Line submitted various updates to its application detailing
its efforts to obtain the necessary state approvals for the project; negotiations
with local governments and landowners; feasibility studies and interconnection
negotiations with utilities, federal power agencies, and RTOs; and other economic and technical evaluations of the project. 2 11
In its 2016 Summary of Findings, DOE explained that Clean Line was
"not a traditional public utility with a franchised service territory, an obligation
to serve captive customers, and cost-of-service rates including an approved return on equity."212 Instead, it was engaged in the project as a "merchant" transmission line company-a "relatively recent entrant in the U.S. transmission
market"-that would charge negotiated rates and assume all the financial risks
associated with the project, rather than being assured a state-approved cost205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

RFP, supra note 204, at 32,941.
Id. at 32,941-42.
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SUMMIARY
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.

OF

FINDINGS,

supra note 204, at 4.
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based rate paid for by retail customers. 2 13 DOE stated that "[m]erchant transmission projects are part of a broader trend toward market competition in the
electric industry" that Congress and FERC "have promoted over the past two
decades." 214 DOE recognized that merchant transmission developers "often lack
legal status as public utilities in the state where a proposed development is located," making state approvals difficult.215
DOE then detailed the efforts Clean Line had made to obtain state regulatory approvals for the project since 2010. In Oklahoma,. Clean Line sought
status as an "electric transmission-only public utility" providing bulk, wholesale
electricity service in Oklahoma but without seeking to provide service to retail
customers in the state like a traditional public utility. 216 The Oklahoma Corporation Commission granted the request in 2011 based on state law that allowed
this form of transmission-only public utility status. 217
However, in Arkansas, the state public service commission denied a similar request by Clean Line in 2011.218 In rejecting Clean Line's application, the
Arkansas commission determined that Clean Line could not obtain public utility status in the state because applicable law required it to transmit power "to or
for the public for compensation," and Clean Line had no contracts for providing electricity to the public in the state of Arkansas. In its decision denying the
request, the commission stated that:
The difficulty the [Arkansas] Commission now faces is that the law
governing public utilities was not drafted to comprehend changes in
the utility industry such as this one-where a non-utility, private enterprise endeavors to fill a void in the transmission of renewable
power that is much needed but for which the Commission is unable
to afford any regulatory oversight.219
Although the Arkansas commission left open the possibility that Clean Line
could reapply for utility status, the Arkansas General Assembly essentially foreclosed that possibility when it enacted legislation in March 2015 prohibiting an
independent, merchant transmission line from obtaining a certificate of public
convenience and necessity. Under the new state law, a certificate cannot be
issued to an entity that is not currently a public utility, primarily transmits electricity, and has not been directed or designated to construct an electric trans213. Id.; see also supra note 73 (defining merchant transmission line company).
214. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SumNUVARY OF FINDINGS, supra note 204, at 5.

215. Id.
216. Id. at 5-6.
217. Id. at 6 (citing Plains & E. Clean Line LLC, Cause No. PUD 201000075, Order No.
590530 (Okla. Corp. Comm'n Oct. 28, 2011)).

218. Id.
219. Id. (citing and quoting Plains & E. Clean Line LLC, Docket No. 10-041-U, Order No. 10
(Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Jan. 11, 2011)).
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mission facility by an RTO.22 0 Thus, the law expressly prohibits merchant
transmission companies from seeking certificates and constructing lines in the
state of Arkansas. 221

Notably, Clean Line has faced similar difficulties obtaining state approval
for its Grain Belt Express project in Missouri and its Rock Island project in
Illinois, despite obtaining the approval of neighboring states for both projects.
For the Grain Belt Express project, Clean Line obtained approval from the
Indiana, Kansas, and Illinois commissions to build the line but in 2015, the
Missouri Public Service Commission denied the company's request for a certificate.2 22 The reasons for the denial included that the project did not address
reliability needs in the state, the project was not needed for in-state utilities to
meet their state renewable portfolio requirements, and that the project was not
in the public interest because it would impose burdens on affected landowners
that outweighed any benefits to the general public. 2 23 After the denial, Clean
Line attempted to build local support for the project and entered into contracts
to supply power from the line to municipal utilities and other local utilitiesin
Missouri. These utilities subsequently supported the project, causing the commission to reconsider its denial in an evidentiary proceeding in March 2017.224
With regard to the Rock Island project, the Illinois Commerce Commission
had granted approval, but landowners challenged it in court leading the Illinois
Court of Appeals to hold that the approval was invalid because Clean Line was

220. Id (citing H.B. 1592, 90th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015), http://perma.cc/M7UC-QLZ4
(codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-3-205 (2015))).
221. For a fifty-state survey of which states allow and which states do not allow merchant transmission lines to obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity or equivalent approvals to construct transmission lines in the state and exercise eminent domain authority, see
Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REv. 1079, 1123-26 (2013).
222. See JOSEPH E. ETO, BUILDING ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION LINEs: A REVIEW OF RECENT
TRANSMISSION PROJECTS 15-16 (2016) (describing the Grain Belt Express project).
223. See id. at 16; see also Grain Belt Express Clean Line LLC for a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity, Report and Order, File No. EA-2014-0207, at 22, 25-26 (Mo. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, July 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/A5TJ-5AX4.
224. After the Missouri commission denial, Clean Line obtained "the backing of 38 utilities,
nearly 70 municipalities, the Missouri Chamber of Commerce, and about 10 Fortune 100
corporate entities with a presence in Missouri that want that clean power to meet their own
sustainability goals." Travis Zimpfer, Clean Line Closing in on Final Order with PSC, Mo.
TIMES (Oct. 16, 2016), http://perma.cc/N4Y7-JX9G. The utilities entered into transmission service agreements "because they cannot get energy as cheap as they can from the grain
belt project." Id.; see also Forrest Gossett, Missouri Regulators to Hear Grain Belt Express Case
March 20-24, HANNIBAL COURIER POST (Mar. 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/TLS2-SKHG
(describing the conflict as an urban versus rural battle); Benjamin Peters, More Cities Line up
for Grain Belt Express Deals as PSC Hears Case for a Second Time, Mo. TIMEs (Mar. 22,
2017).
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That decision is on appeal to the Illinois Supreme

2 26

Court.

Despite setbacks at the state level for the Plains & Eastern project, Clean
Line sought and obtained permission from FERC to conduct direct negotiations with wind farms and other electricity generators for transmission service
rates. 227 DOE also began the environmental review process for the project and
evaluation of the section 1222 RFP requirements, resulting in consultation with
other federal agencies as well as solicitation of comments from the public. 22 8
In the March 2016 Summary of Findings, DOE detailed the conditions of
the participation agreement with Clean Line. These include DOE assisting
with right-of-way acquisition and exercising eminent domain authority when
necessary, once Clean Line satisfied conditions related to the commercial viability of the project. 229 DOE would own all the project facilities in Arkansas,
but all costs of these facilities, like all the costs of the project, would be borne by
Clean Line. 23 0 DOE also set forth the reasons why it believed it had authority
to enter into the participation agreement with Clean Line and also exercise
eminent domain authority for the project, if needed. 2 31 The detailed discussion
of DOE's legal authority was likely prompted by the numerous public comments DOE received from state attorneys general, members of Congress, and
others contending that use of eminent domain authority without state approval
would improperly interfere with states' authority over property rights and land
use regulation within their borders. 23 2
The Summary of Findings went on to explain why the proposal met all the
section 1222 statutory factors-that the project would meet a projected increased demand for electricity, would be consistent with transmission needs
225. Ill. Landowners All. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 2016 IL App (3d) 150099 (Ill. Ct. App.,
3rd Dist., Aug. 10, 2016) (holding that Rock Island Clean Line is not a public utility and
thus cannot obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct an electric
transmission line in the state because it does not have assets in the state, does not have
agreements for service with renewable energy generators in the state, and does not devote
assets to public use in the state without discrimination because the anchor wind tenants are
in other states).
226. Jeffrey Tomich, Ill. High Court to Hear Clean Line Transmission Dispute, ENERGYWIRE
(Nov. 28, 2016), http://perma.cc/64XC-58YH.
227. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SUMMARY OF FINDINGs, supra note 204, at 6. FERC typically
grants such authority to merchant transmission lines but not to traditional public utilities
because merchant transmission line companies assume all the market risks of a project and
have no captive customers to recover costs, as is the case with a traditional public utility. See
id. (citing Plains & E. Clean Line LLC, 148 FERC ¶ 61,122 at ¶ 1 n.1 (2014)).
228. See id. at 7-9.
229. See id at 10-11.
230. See id. at 11.
231. See id. at 15-18.
232. See id. at 15 n.83, 15-18, 20-21 (discussing criticisms and responses to DOE's assertion of
authority to exercise eminent domain authority for the project).
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identified by the relevant RTO, would improve grid reliability, would be operated consistent with prudent utility practices, and would operate in conformance with rules of the appropriate RTOs. 233 Finally, the decision document
addressed each of the DOE's RFP factors-public interest, promoting renewable energy, economic and environmental impacts in affected states, and technical and financial viability.23 4 For these factors, the decision document focused
mostly on whether the project would facilitate the development of renewable
energy (concluding that it would) and also the extent to which the project
would create jobs and enhance economic development in the states in which
the project traverses. 23 5 Thus, in addition to a more traditional federal review of
the project's regional and national benefits, similar to what FERC does in reviewing interstate natural gas pipelines, the RFP required DOE to conduct a
very careful review of the economic and environmental benefits and harms to
two specific states-Oklahoma and Arkansas.
With regard to its assessment of impacts in Oklahoma and Arkansas,
DOE concluded that the project would generate short-term and long-term jobs
in both states; that economic benefits would flow from the construction, operation, and maintenance of the project; and that the project would generate substantial tax revenues for both states because the project facilities that would be
built in both states are taxable. 236 According to DOE, these economic benefits
also included the development of wind resources and associated jobs in
Oklahoma facilitated by the project 237 and a significant decrease in energy production costs in Arkansas-and thus lower costs to Arkansas citizens and businesses-as a result of Arkansas utilities gaining greater access to low-cost wind
energy. 238 As for negative landowner and environmental impacts, DOE noted
that "landowner impacts are a regrettable but unavoidable consequence of infrastructure projects," and that this is "especially true for linear infrastructure
projects that traverse long distances, such as transmission lines, pipelines, railroads, and highways." 239 Because of the inevitability of these impacts, the key
point, according to DOE, was whether the project has made efforts to minimize the impacts, and in this case, DOE found that Clean Line had done so. 2 40
DOE's decision on the Plains & Eastern Clean Line project is significant.
First, the decision is the first time DOE has exercised the authority Congress
granted it in section 1222 of the EPAct 2005 to collaborate on a private project
in an effort to overcome state siting and eminent domain barriers to an inter233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See id. at 21-41.
See id. at 41-68.
See id.
See id. at 43-44, 57-62.
See id. at 58.
See id. at 60.
Id. at 44.
See id. at 44-48.
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state electric transmission line designed to serve multistate regional electricity
needs and promote renewable energy. If the Trump Administration DOE continues to support Clean Line, and the courts uphold DOE's authority, this
action represents a potential new path towards regional grid expansion that
better matches contemporary regional energy needs and policies in at least the
portion of the nation within the WAPA and SWPA footprints.
Perhaps more importantly, however, DOE's decision represents a new approach towards approving multistate energy transport projects that differs from
the conventional FERC model for interstate natural gas pipelines as well as the
traditional state model for interstate electric transmission lines. The FERC
model for interstate natural gas pipelines pays little attention to state economic
impacts associated with projects. 241That is simply beyond the scope of the relevant evaluation, because applicable FERC regulations place the focus on regional and national energy needs. There is also not nearly as much emphasis on
landowner opposition and concerns in affected states (separate and apart from
traditional environmental impacts studied in the environmental review process)
in evaluating interstate natural gas pipelines. On the flip side, states often do
not consider regional or national electric transmission and electric energy needs
in evaluating interstate electric transmission lines. Understandably, state public
utility commissions tend to view their jurisdiction as predominantly limited to
state economic and energy issues, ensuring that the project will benefit the
state's electricity ratepayers.
By contrast, DOE's Summary of Findings has an extensive evaluation of
both regional and in-state impacts of the project. There is a significant discussion of how the project will connect with other regional grid operators, including RTOs, and of how the project will facilitate increased renewable energy
penetration over a multistate region. Unlike a FERC approval document for an
interstate natural gas pipeline, the Summary of Findings contains a broad discussion of economic, landowner, and environmental impacts in the states of
Arkansas and Oklahoma. Because of the RFP factors, this evaluation is highly
relevant to DOE's decision, thus giving state impacts a more prominent role
than is generally seen in a federal evaluation of an energy transport project.
Thus, the DOE Summary of Findings represents a potential new approach to
striking a federalism balance between the federal government and the states in
the controversial area of interstate electric grid expansion.

241. See supra Part I.A.
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RECONSTITUTING THE BATTLE LINES: INTEGRATING STATE
INTERESTS INTO FEDERAL APPROVALS TO
OVERCOME SITING IMPASSES

The conventional framework for approaching jurisdiction over the siting
and planning of energy transportation infrastructure has led to a regulatory and
policy impasse. It has enabled contentious and prolonged disputes surrounding
FERC's approval of new natural gas pipeline projects, as well as a concern that
overly broad preemption in Natural Gas Act certificate proceedings invites federal regulators to run roughshod over state and local interests. For interstate
electric transmission lines, the conventional framework has encouraged state
regulators to block several important efforts to expand electric transmission infrastructure that would increase grid reliability and allow greater integration of
renewable electric energy resources.
However, a solution to these federalism battles does not necessarily rest on
Congress expanding federal preemption of states in the siting of interstate natural gas pipelines and interstate electric transmission lines. It is certainly true
that calls to expand federal authority have been the "go-to" solution in the past
when dealing with roadblocks facing interstate infrastructure such as natural gas
pipelines in the 1930s, LNG import and export terminals in the early 2000s,
and road transportation projects like the national highway system in the 1950s.
It is also true that a one-stop, federal siting approach creates a more streamlined and efficient approval process with less veto points. This would mean
creating enhanced federal siting and eminent domain authority for interstate
electric transmission lines. It would also mean eliminating or modifying existing state veto points in interstate natural gas pipeline siting by eliminating
state CWA section 401 certification requirements in that context or granting
federal override authority, similar to the process under the Coastal Zone Management Act. Indeed, in the context of interstate electric transmission lines, in
earlier work both authors have emphasized the need for federal siting authority
as one solution to addressing federalism battles that have hindered electric grid
expansion (and thus renewable energy integration expansion).2 42
But we also recognize that reducing state veto points will thwart enforcement of important environmental standards and silence important voices in the
evaluative process that are more attuned to local environmental and land use
impacts and, in the case of natural gas pipelines, often more attuned to global
climate change concerns and promoting renewable energy than are federal

242. See, e.g., Ashley Brown &Jim Rossi, Siting TransmissionLines in a ChangedMilieu: Evolving
Notions ofthe "PublicInterest" in Balancing State and RegionalConsiderations, 81 U. COLO. L.
REv. 705, 741-48 (2010); Klass, supra note 9, at 1943-46; Klass & Rossi, supra note 60, at
133-34; Klass & Wilson, supra note 58, at 1859-65; Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Transmission Line Siting, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1017 (2009).

472

HarvardEnvironmentalLaw Review

[Vol. 41

agencies. 243 Like the NEPA process itself, meaningful state evaluation and input can result in projects with reduced adverse environmental and land use impacts and, in some cases, can prevent projects that, in hindsight, were neither
cost-effective nor environmentally sound. For instance, states played a major
role in the early 2000s in blocking several long-distance, interstate electric
transmission lines that would have facilitated the addition of major, coal-fired
power plants into the northeastern electric grid. 2 44 At the time, no one anticipated that the United States would ever move away from coal as a major source
of baseload electric generation. Now, of course, the nation has already done so
and is quickly moving towards an electricity future focused on natural gas and
renewable energy as a matter of economics, even if not necessarily supported by
federal policy during the Trump Administration.
Moreover, congressional expansion of federal siting authority for electric
transmission lines and reduction of existing state veto authority under the
CWA for interstate natural gas pipelines will not reduce opposition to projects
or protracted litigation over them. Unless states are rendered completely voiceless in the process (which is highly unlikely under any presidential administration or Congress), opponents (i.e., governments and other interested parties)
can be expected to use whatever tools they have to oppose such projects for local
land use, environmental, economic, or climate change reasons, and thus more
federal authority for such projects as a stand-alone solution may help in some
cases, but not in all cases.
Notably, both state and federal regulators have recently made some significant efforts to innovate beyond conventional jurisdictional battle lines. When
faced with jurisdictional impasses, regulators have developed new approaches
that do not rely on placing ultimate siting authority clearly on one side or the
other of the jurisdictional divide. In lieu of the conventional approach to dividing authority-presumptively favoring federal authority for pipelines and state
authority for electric transmission lines-both state and federal regulators have
shown appreciation for a more collaborative approach to energy transportation
siting. Such approaches may help to move energy transportation debates be-

243. It is well recognized in the energy industry that states are more responsive to local concerns
than are federal regulators, allowing local opponents of energy infrastructure projects more
power to successfully oppose projects where state law governs. See, e.g., Jenny Mandel,
Protesters' Win "a Wakeup Call"for Other Pipeline Projects, ENERGYWIRE (Dec. 6, 2016),
http://perma.cc/FW2Q-65J6 (quoting public affairs expert stating that it is easier to work
with FERC and federal legislators for project approval "'than it is to go to 50 different towns
along your pipeline route' holding open houses and coffee gatherings, only to be met by state
officials worried about the level of local opposition they're experiencing").
244. See, e.g., Steve Huntoon, The Rise and FallofBig Transmission, Pus. UInL. FORT. 32, 39-41
(Sept. 2015) (arguing that state proceedings and open stakeholder processes are a potentially
good correction to slow down, modify, or kill many "big transmission" projects that, in hindsight, were not necessary and that such state and stakeholder processes work instead in favor
of more incremental transmission solutions).
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yond the impasse that has plagued conventional debates surrounding energy
siting, even in the absence of congressional action.
For instance, FERC's initial rule on backstop siting authority over electric
transmission lines under EPAct 2005 only seemed to shift in one direction-in
favor of increased federal authority based on the conventional approach to natural gas pipeline siting. By contrast, recent efforts by federal regulators in addressing electric transmission siting in the context of the Plains & Eastern
Clean Line project illustrate how a federal process can better integrate the judgment and expertise of state regulators into federal siting procedures. Although
the DOE decision did not necessarily integrate the views of state regulators, it
at least evaluated state benefits and costs and, in a future proceeding, could take
the next step to more fully integrate state concerns. Indeed, present day trends
towards a greater integration of gas and electric in the operation of the energy
sectors highlights how the days of thinking about siting jurisdiction as a oneway ratchet have come to an end. Especially since gas has become integral to
the transformation towards a lower carbon emission electric grid, it is more
important that FERC and state regulators both play a major role in recognizing
this connection and using existing authority under the Natural Gas Act and the
Federal Power Act to bring the siting regimes more in line. Thus, in this Part,
we draw on recent innovations by regulators to discuss particular opportunities
for siting convergence between gas and electric regulation.
With these issues in mind, this Part evaluates potential actions federal
agencies and project proposers can take to create innovative regulatory pathways
for project siting. Section A explores in more detail how the DOE's recent
integration of state concerns into its exercise of section 1222 authority produces
substantial procedural and legal benefits-which courts may reinforce through
judicial review. Section B discusses how extending state input and enhanced
evaluation of state economic benefits early in the FERC pipeline permitting
process can produce similar procedural and legal benefits. Section C delves further into how recognition of an enhanced analysis of state benefits and harms
early in the FERC process can produce positive incentives for private interest
groups, by encouraging project proposers to offer more targeted mitigation
(both environmental and economic) that can address at least some state and
local concerns prior to the issuance of a federal certificate in the case of interstate natural gas pipelines and state approvals in the case of interstate electric
transmission lines.
A.

EncouragingFederalRegulators to Weigh State Interests in Electric
Transmission Line Siting

As discussed above, 245 DOE's approval of the Plains & Eastern Clean Line
application illustrates a potential new path for federal regulators to approach
transmission line siting through a process that, at least on the surface, appears
245. See supra Part I.D.
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to be respectful of state concerns. 2 46 Instead of making its own assessment of
need based entirely on interstate grid concerns, such as a need for grid expansion to meet national objectives, DOE explicitly placed considerable weight on
in-state benefits in approving Clean Line's application. 247 By recognizing the
significance of state interests in approving new interstate energy transportation
processes, such as economic growth and new jobs, DOE has taken an approach
that no longer risks leaving state and local governments sitting on the sideline
in federal siting processes. Such an approach by federal regulators has significant promise in overcoming jurisdictional impasses over the siting for new electric transmission infrastructure, though there are also at least two limitations to
it.

The first limitation relates to the pragmatic limitations of federal regulators. Without doubt, a federal regulator such as DOE is better able to bring an
objective, "big picture" evaluation to the assessment of the benefits to a state of
siting a new project, especially where the state or local process is mired in parochial concerns. Federal regulators may also be best positioned to trade off costs
and benefits between states, where one state benefits at another's costs. But
federal regulators may not have access to the best information regarding how
each state benefits, or to fully assess the degree of benefits to each state. A state
regulatory process is more likely to produce a more accurate and fuller picture of
this. Nor should a federal regulatory process such as DOE's approval of applications under section 1222 of EPAct 2005 be approached in a manner that
crowds out state and local discussion of a project's benefits and costs. It would
seem important that federal regulators give state and local governments the first
bite at the apple, so to speak, in initiating any discussion of a project's state
benefits and costs. Of course, in the end, federal regulators can ultimately reject
a state or local government's findings regarding benefits-especially when parochial interest groups dominate a local regulatory process. In doing so, federal
regulators should first make a determination that a local government either
failed to consider or was insufficiently attentive to these benefits.
The second limitation is jurisdictional. Federal siting and eminent domain
authority under section 1222 is only available for limited projects in certain
regions of the country.2 48 Still, DOE's recent approach of recognizing vital state
interests in evaluating electric transmission line approval provides a fruitful
246. Of course, there is significant disagreement on this point, as evidenced by the Arkansas
congressional delegation's introduction of federal legislation attempting to overturn DOE's
decision. See Bill Loveless, Battle over Big Energy Infrastructure Heats Up, USA TODAY
(Mar. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/3YK5-RXU7. DOE's decision has also been subject to
legal challenge by landowners, states, and other parties on grounds that DOE did not adequately take state interests into account in its approval and that it lacks authority to approve
the project under federal law.
247. See supra Part H.D.
248. See id.
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template for federal regulators considering infrastructure siting decisions in
other contexts. These include future efforts by DOE to adopt NIETCs over
which FERC can exercise backstop siting authority, where state regulators may
be better positioned to evaluate potential project benefits and location-related
issues prior to DOE. 249 Similarly, in approaching backstop siting, FERC
should not focus entirely on national or regional needs but should also recognize how any project presents both benefits and harms for each affected state
prior to making a decision to preempt state regulators. Engaging these benefits
and harms will better integrate state regulators into the federal siting processes
and reduce the likelihood of conflict if a federal regulator decides to exercise
preemption authority, including eminent domain.
These recent efforts by DOE in utilizing section 1222 are consistent with
recent executive branch policy as well as DOE rules. 250 A memorandum issued
by the Obama Administration in 2012 called for expedited review of domestic
pipeline projects, as well as better coordination between federal agencies and
the states.251 DOE's recent approach to electric transmission infrastructure in
implementing section 1222 is consistent with the objectives of these directives.
They also are consistent with congressional efforts to implement better coordination in pipeline siting. EPAct 2005, the same statute that added section
1222, also amended the Federal Power Act to add section 2116(h), 25 2 which
directed the DOE to "act as the lead agency for coordinating all applicable
Federal authorizations and related environmental reviews required under Federal law in order to site an electric transmission facility" and to issue any necessary implementing regulations. 253 In September 2016, DOE issued a final rule
pursuant to this provision to establish a "simplified Integrated Interagency Preapplication ['1IP'] process to site electric transmission facilities." 25 4 A primary
focus of this regulation is to create an optional pre-application process to coor249. For example, Ashira Ostrow has argued that, although federal law imposes constraints on
the transmission line siting process, it must be attentive to procedures that encourage participation by state and local governments. See Ashira Ostrow, Process Preemption in FederalSiting Regimes, 48 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 289, 290 (2011).
250. President Trump has also stated that he will make infrastructure projects a priority for his
administration, although it is unclear how infrastructure is to be defined. See, e.g., Press
Release, White House, President Trump is Working to Rebuild Our Nation's Infrastructure
(Feb. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/G7U5-VDUG; David Shepardson, Trump to Meet with
Business Leaders on Infrastructure, REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/CBA3-96YT.
251. See Memorandum from the President, Expediting Review of Pipeline Projects from Cushing, Oklahoma to Port Arthur, Texas and Other Domestic Pipeline Infrastructure Projects
(Mar. 22, 2012), http://perma.cc/8U9Q-6U8N.
252. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(h) (2012).
253. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SUMMARY OF REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING FEDERAL POWER
ACT SECTION 216(H) 1 (Sept. 2008), https://perma.cc/CCX2-HER7.
254. DOE Coordination of Federal Authorizations for Electric Transmission Facilities, 81 Fed.
Reg. 66,500, 66,500-02 (Sept. 28, 2016) (codified at 10 C.F.R. § 900.1).
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dinate NEPA review and evaluation when multiple federal agencies must sign
off on a transmission project (for instance, a project that crosses federal lands,
impacts endangered species or historic resources, requires a water crossing that
triggers a federal permit requirement, etc.). But the rule also emphasizes early,
pre-application coordination with "non-federal entities," such as states, local
governments, and stakeholders.255 DOE's IIP rule details the creation of an
"IIP administrative file" and requires a summary of "early identification project
issues" intended to provide "a summary of stakeholder outreach or interactions
... to inform the development of issues and project alternatives for study in an
environmental review document."25 6 When the administrative record contemplated by the rule is complete, DOE convenes a series of meetings with federal
and non-federal entities to discuss potential impacts of the project as well as
potential avoidance and mitigation measures. All of the written materials and
meetings become part of the "IIP Process administrative file" which in turn
becomes part of each federal agency's record for purposes of the agency's decision and judicial review. 25 7
DOE's IIP rule, along with DOE's separate efforts to evaluate state benefits and impacts as part of the section 1222 process, illustrates a potential path
forward to early involvement and fuller evaluation of environmental and economic issues of interest to both federal and state permitting entities and stakeholders. Such early collaboration and evaluation of the issues may, at least in
some instances, allow for route changes, mitigation measures, and structured
discussion among stakeholders and state and federal permitting entities that can
reduce post-permitting vetoes or legal challenges. Indeed, one representative of
the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, which represents electric
utility cooperatives nationwide, stated that the new rule can "encourage transmission developers to do a lot of consultation-not only with federal agencies,
but state agencies and tribes-before the application, and that would be a way
of facilitating more coordination after the application actually gets done."258
255. Id. at 66,507. The rule defines a "non-federal entity" as:
an Indian Tribe, multistate governmental entity, or state and local government
agency with relevant expertise and/or jurisdiction within the project area, that is
responsible for conducting permitting and environmental reviews of the proposed
qualifying project or its attendant facilities, that has special expertise with respect to
environmental and other issues pertinent to or that are potentially affected by the
proposed qualifying project or its attendant facilities, or provides funding for the
proposed qualifying project or its attendant facilities.
Id. at 66,508.
256. Id. at 66,510.
257. Id. at 66,513.
258. Rebecca Kern, Utilities Optimistic Rule Will Shorten Transmission Line Siting, DALY ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 47 ENR 2822 (Sept. 30, 2016) (quoting Pam Siberstein, Senior Dir., Power
Supply Counsel at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association).

2017]

Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in Energy Transportation

477

These approaches create substantial pragmatic procedural benefits for both
private parties and regulators. For instance, the Great Northern Transmission
Line designed to bring hydropower resources from Manitoba, Canada to
northern Minnesota demonstrates how a project proposer's efforts to engage in
early consultation with local communities prior to route selection diminishes
local opposition in the permitting process and expedites both state and federal
permitting processes. The Great Northern Transmission Line is a 224-mile,
500-kV transmission line developed by Minnesota Power, an investor-owned
utility in northern Minnesota, proposed to transport 883 MW of hydropower
resources from the Minnesota-Manitoba border to Grand Rapids, Minnesota,
to serve Minnesota Power's customers. 259 Minnesota Power conducted seventyfive public information workshops in the area of the proposed line, many of
which took place before the proposer submitted its state certificate of need application or selected a final proposed route.26 0 Because the line crosses an international border, Minnesota Power had to obtain a Presidential Permit from
DOE, a certificate of need and a route permit from the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, and complete state and federal environmental review
processes associated with the multiple state and federal approvals required. 261
Minnesota Power obtained the state certificate of need in June 2015, the state
route permit in April 2016, and the Presidential Permit in November 2016.262
The state and federal environmental review processes were conducted
jointly, saving time and expense. According to a Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory report evaluating the project in connection with a broad review of
current transmission projects around the country, all of the state and federal
permits were obtained within three years "in part because of extensive advance
public outreach that reduced potential opposition and roadblocks to the project,
and in part because the federal and state environmental review process took
place in tandem." 263 Moreover, according to this report, "[p]roactive engagement enabled the project developers to hear and take into consideration public
and stakeholder concerns before putting forth routing proposals" which "signaled early on their openness to hearing public and stakeholder concerns" and a
"willingness to address these concerns by taking explicit account of them in
their initial routing proposal." 26 4 Thus, the Great Northern Transmission line
project as well as the CapX2020 transmission line projects in the Midwest dis259. ETO, supra note 222, at 13.
260. Id. at 13-14.
261. Id. at 14-15; see also U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, GREAT NORTHERN TRANSMISSION LINE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2016), http://perma.cc/UND7-7L56 (repository
of EIS-related documents for project).
262. ETO, supra note 222, at 13-15; U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY No. PP-398, PRESIDENTIAL PERMIT MINN. POWER (2016), http://perma.cc/PY4X-M7F5.
263. ETO, supra note 222, at 15.
264. Id. at 22.
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cussed earlier show that projects can avoid protracted delays and litigation with
careful planning and early consultation with stakeholders.
These examples illustrate that early consultation with federal and state
agencies and the public and a willingness to negotiate on routing can save time
and expense in the long run. It is important to note however that the Great
Northern Transmission Line project had several additional factors in its favor
that distinguish it from the Clean Line projects and other projects that have not
fared so well. First, Minnesota Power is an investor-owned utility with retail
customers in the state who will stand to benefit directly from Minnesota
Power's procurement of additional low-cost, renewable energy resources. Second, Minnesota Power had to obtain a siting permit from a single state, rather
than multiple states, and thus could focus its efforts on public outreach and
articulating in-state benefits in a single forum rather than multiple forums. Indeed, the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory report that highlighted Minnesota Power's success also discussed Clean Line's Grain Belt Express project,
and recognized that projects involving multiple states are "more complicated,"
and it is imperative that the project proposer ensure "that there are identifiable
project beneficiaries within each state from which approval has to be obtained."265 Finally, the Great Northern Transmission Line traverses a part of
Minnesota that is sparsely populated, leading to less opposition than often exists with regard to transmission lines in other parts of the country. Nevertheless,
the experience of the Great Northern Transmission Line, coupled with the new
DOE rule and DOE's efforts under section 1222, create a template committed
project proposers and agencies can utilize to reduce permitting roadblocks and
improve agency evaluation of the costs and benefits associated with electric
transmission expansion projects.
Finally, the benefits of such an approach go beyond pragmatic politics.
They also extend to arbitrary and capricious review by courts. Courts have long
held agencies to a decision-making standard that disfavors a one-sided rush to
judgment that does not fully vet a broad range of values, including those of
local communities, to ensure that agency decisions reflect a pluralist set of values and are not made in a biased manner. 266 Where an agency has made a
proactive effort to address state concerns in a siting proceeding, it is less likely
to be reversed for failing to consider an important aspect of the problem it is
addressing in approving (or failing to approve) a project. 267 Where Congress has
specifically directed an agency to consider various perspectives and evidence, as
265. Id. at 23.
266. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); see also Peter L.
Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park- PoliticalandJudicial Controls over Administrative Actions
Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1251 (1992).
267. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43
(1983) (noting that a decision is arbitrary and capricious where an agency "entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem").
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it has in NEPA, the agency has an even greater responsibility to ensure that it is
not ignoring these perspectives in its ultimate decision. Agencies should thus
expect courts to be more deferential to their ultimate decisions involving project
siting where they have proactively taken a comprehensive approach similar to
DOE's recently invoked section 1222 process.
B.

Reforming*FERC Natural Gas Pipeline Siting to Integrate State and Local
Interests in Determining Project Routing andApproval

The federal-state conflict is perhaps at its height in the context of natural
gas pipeline siting, where a combination of environmental interests concerned
with the climate change impacts of continued dependency on fossil fuels have
built formidable coalitions with property right advocates to encourage state regulators to hold out from project approval. As the ongoing objections of New
York regulators to the Constitution Pipeline illustrate, 26 8 FERC's natural gas
pipeline siting determinations could also benefit from earlier and more substantive integration of state interests in its analysis-as the Obama Administration
recommended in its 2012 memorandum on pipeline infrastructure siting. 269
Conventionally, FERC's centralized approach to pipeline siting has relegated
state governments to a seat on the sidelines. This federal-centric process may
historically have made gas pipelines less of a political firestorm than interstate
electric transmission lines, but that has changed-as is evident in the number of
high visibility recent protests surrounding FERC's approval of natural gas pipeline and compressor station projects. 270
New York's recent rejection of the Constitution Pipeline underscores how
federal environmental law still provides state governments a meaningful procedural point of entry, even in the federal-centric interstate gas pipeline siting
process. FERC-sponsored hearings on the Constitution Pipeline provided
some opportunity for state and local input on the project. 271 The concerns of
state regulators were weighed as input by FERC, primarily as a part of the
federal environmental review process. 27 2 These discussions led the applicant to
adopt a new route for the pipeline, reducing the environmental impacts as well
as the need for an additional compressor station.273 At the same time, FERC
rejected a request for a hearing to address environmental concerns during the
section 7 proceedings. 274 The New York environmental regulator's rejection of
the project's section 401 certification under the CWA following FERC's ap268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

See supra Part I.C.
See supra note 251.
See, e.g., supra note 169 and accompanying text (reporting on protests at FERC).
See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra note 178.
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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proval of the section 7 certificate under the Natural Gas Act, in effect, allowed
an eleventh-hour veto point over the project-a decision that many who are
concerned with the climate impacts of the Constitution Pipeline celebrated. 275
While the savings clause in the Natural Gas Act, along with case law,
appears to allow states some ability to address environmental concerns such as
water quality following the issuance of a certificate by FERC, this is a costly
and inefficient procedural way of addressing these important state issues. We
see two primary deficiencies in FERC's current approach to pipeline approval.
First, FERC does not systematically invite state environmental regulators to
share their expertise and judgment on the record in federal pipeline certification
decisions, or regularly provide a forum for vetting these concerns. Second, the
timing of FERC's section 7 certificate process seems to invite potential challengers and state regulators to sit back and let FERC decide the locational
issues without fully addressing environmental concerns, inviting eleventh hour
state veto points in CWA permits that conflate siting and environmental issues
and have no ready resolution. Addressing these deficiencies can produce many
of the same benefits as DOE's section 1222 transmission line approval process,
including more efficient procedures and a higher likelihood of courts upholding
FERC pipeline permitting decisions.
1.

FacilitatingEarly Consultation with States and Other Stakeholders

Consistent with the Obama Administration's 2012 memorandum calling
for better coordination in pipeline siting276 (an approach the Trump Administration might be expected to follow in its efforts to expand energy infrastructure), we believe that the interactions between decisions regarding pipeline
routing and environmental impacts are best addressed earlier, in an integrated
federal siting procedure. One way for this to occur would be for FERC to
model its review of gas pipeline routing applications after DOE's consideration
of state interests in approving Clean Line's section 1222 application. It could
also adopt a version of DOE's IIP Process under its existing statutory authority
in order to better coordinate and evaluate state and local interests that might
otherwise arise after the fact through CWA or Coastal Zone Management Act
objections.
In other words, rather than making a determination regarding the routing
of a project prior to state environmental review-an approach that encourages
state regulators and environmental interest groups to hold out in presenting
information and formally expressing concerns with a project-FERC could explicitly invite and engage state participation in the pre-filing stage of pipeline
certificate review as well as concurrent with its review of the routing of projects
275. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 251.

2017]

Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in Energy Transportation

481

in the certification proceedings. In making a provisional assessment of pipeline
routing in pipeline certificate proceedings, FERC could improve the quality of
environmental evaluation of a project by incorporating input from state environmental regulators into the federal assessment of a project's impact. FERC
also might consider a streamlined, fast-track approach to pipeline certification
in situations where the applicant has received conditional state approval from
state regulators of environmental permits related to pipeline routing-placing
the state environmental review of a project before FERC's review. Such approaches would allow FERC to more formally integrate an assessment of the
benefits and burdens for individual states into its approval of pipeline projects.
As is discussed below, the net effect of such approaches would be to encourage
project developers to more proactively pursue state and local environmental review early on, and make concessions if necessary, reducing the need for interest
groups to look to state environmental processes as a way of blocking projects at
the back end, which (as the example of the Constitution Pipeline shows) can
serve as an eleventh-hour veto point.
To improve the engagement of state regulators in the pre-filing stage of
pipeline approval, FERC could adopt a guidance document or a rule similar to
the DOE's IIP Process that highlights how state environmental regulators can
play a role in this early phase of pipeline consideration. FERC and pipeline
sponsors routinely hold informational meetings regarding pipelines at the prefiling stage of pipeline certification,277 but FERC should consider seeking the
formal input of state regulators at this stage too. 27 8 More formal consultation
with state regulators early in the federal pipeline siting process can also improve
the quality of the record on which FERC is making decisions regarding pipeline routing. 279 FERC should consider multistage consultation with state regulators, 28 0 perhaps inviting EPA to also play a role early in the pipeline siting
277. See, e.g., Pre-Filingfor All Natural Gas Projects, FERC, http://perma.cc/FC23-93VB.
278. FERC already seeks early input from the Army Corps of Engineers at the pre-filing stage in
interstate gas pipeline siting proceedings. See Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Supplementing
the Interagency Agreement on Early Coordination of Required Environmental and Historic
Preservation Reviews Conducted in Conjunction with the Issuance of Authorizations to
Construct and Operate Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines Certificated by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (June 30, 2005), http://perma.cc/U9C6-G4UW.
279. On the benefits of agency consultation in improving coordination, see Jody Freeman & Jim
Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 ILuRv. L. REv. 1131, 1133
(2012).
280. Pursuant to 18 C.F.R. §§ 4.38, 5.1(d), and 16.8, applicants seeking an exemption, original
license, new license, or an amendment to a license for a hydropower project must consult
with relevant federal, state, and interstate resource agencies, Indian tribes, and non-governmental agencies. 18 C.F.R §§ 4.38, 5.1(d), 16.8 (2017). FERC routinely uses multistage
consultation in the context of hydropower licensing, although there is a continued need for
better coordination with state regulators. See, e.g., Initial Consultation Contact List, FERC,
http://perma.cc/5X9R-MRAJ ("Pursuant to 18 C.F.R. §§ 4.38, 5.1(d), and 16.8, applicants
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process in order to resolve any conflicts between FERC and states regarding
whether state conditions relating to the location or routing of a pipeline relate
to "water quality" under the CWA, or stem from other concerns. This may
prove especially important in the context of multistate projects in which different state regulators have a different assessment of environmental impacts affecting water quality.
Yet another option would be for FERC to act pursuant to the Fixing
America's Surface Transportation Act ("FAST Act"), which Congress enacted
in 2015, to include the reforms suggested in this section to expand the certificate of need process to include greater emphasis on state concerns, including
climate and other environmental impacts. The FAST Act2 1 was "Congress's
first multiyear federal transportation bill enacted in a decade."28 2 One section of
the law created additional procedures for federal permitting of major infrastructure projects to promote improved coordination and stricter deadlines for permitting decisions.283 The law creates the new Federal Infrastructure Permitting
Improvement Steering Council with most control of the council vested in the
Office of Management and Budget and the Council on Environmental Quality. 284 The law covers federal approvals for a wide range of energy infrastructure
projects requiring federal approvals (including pipelines) that are subject to
NEPA review and are likely to involve more than $200 million in investment. 2 s5
The Council includes representation from numerous executive agencies, but
also FERC and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, independent agencies
that have not previously been part of executive branch agency coordination on
permitting. 286 Notably, the law also contains new provisions to coordinate state
and federal environmental review processes for projects and to allow for the
formation of interstate compacts for regional infrastructure development. 28 7 It
also creates shorter timetables for judicial review of the NEPA process for covered projects. 288 Thus, FERC, through rulemaking or on a case-by-case basis
through the new Steering Council, could rely on the FAST Act to revise its
seeking an exemption, original license, new license, or an amendment to a license for a
hydropower project must consult with relevant Federal, State, and interstate resource agencies, Indian tribes, and non-governmental agencies.").
281. Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015).
&

282. See THOMAS C. JENSEN, SANDRA A. SNODGRASS, & MATTHEW CASTELLI, HOLLAND
HART, INFRASTRUCTURE PERMIT STREAMLINING UNDER THE FAST ACT 1 (2016),

https://perma.cc/98EU-WJ53.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2, 4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4-5.
287. See MARIE QUASIUS ET AL., K&L GATES, FAST ACT EXPEDITES PERMITTING AND EN283.
284.
285.
286.

VIRONMENTAL

REVIEW

http://perma.cc/YU8G-629E.

288. See id.

FOR

LARGE

INFRASTRUCTURE

PROJECTS

(2016),
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current approach to pipeline project reviews and facilitate broader state and
regional review of pipeline projects.
Finally, although FERC has so far resisted efforts by environmental
groups, states, and EPA to expand its evaluation of environmental impacts of
natural gas pipelines to include upstream and downstream climate impacts, one
wonders whether FERC could reduce some of the opposition to its projects by
doing so. One can certainly argue that merely considering those impacts in the
permitting process and then approving the project anyway will not in any way
reduce opposition to those projects. Simply because an agency like FERC does
a NEPA analysis of environmental impacts does not eliminate or arguably even
reduce lawsuits challenging the validity of the analysis after it is completed. But
at least in some cases, a fuller analysis of climate impacts may show that certain
natural gas pipeline projects, by displacing coal, actually have climate benefits,
while other natural gas pipelines projects, which would tend to replace renewables, will result in adverse climate impacts and thus perhaps should not go
forward or should be modified. It is true that in the Trump administration, it is
likely that EPA will no longer put pressure on FERC to evaluate these impacts,
but that will not stop states and environmental groups from doing so and, ultimately, courts may become more sympathetic to their arguments. Moreover,
FERC is an independent federal agency and thus even if EPA reduces its pressure on FERC to take action, FERC may choose on its own to conduct a
greater evaluation of climate impacts even if it is not consistent with the Trump
administration agenda.289
2.

Other ProceduralImprovements to the FERC Permitting Process

Even beyond improving engagement and consultation with state regulators and expanding the scope of analysis, FERC should consider other procedural improvements to its pipeline siting process. For example, FERC could
withhold final determination of a proposed pipeline's routing pending a state
environmental regulator's initial decisions regarding CWA permits. This could
be done by issuing a provisional pipeline siting permit, pending the outcome of
289. For instance, in February 2017, FERC revised its guidance for natural gas project applicants,
directing them to quantify the project's local and regional contribution to global warming
and expanded the analysis of air quality impacts required to be submitted to FERC. This
guidance revision may be a partial response to the continued criticism by the Obama EPA
and environmental groups that FERC had been too narrow in its review of climate-related
impacts of natural gas infrastructure projects. See FERC, MANUAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
(2017), https://perma.cc/PZC3-TZXH; FRED JAUSS & CHAD RicHARDs
WHITNEY,

FERC

GAS

ACT 4-1
, DORSEY

&

REPORT PREPARATION FOR APPLICATIONS FILED UNDER THE NATURAL

ISSUES UPDATED GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT

PREPARATION UNDER THE NATURAL GAS ACT (2017), https://perma.cc/3A6G-XX9N;
Hannah Northey, FERC Keeps Obama Guidance Alive in Manualfor Gas Projects, GREEN-

WIRE .(Feb. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/J2LA-4BCW.
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state environmental review that affects the project's ultimate routing-as would
the permit decisions of New York regulators for the Constitution Pipeline.290
Such procedural improvements would allow FERC to base pipeline routing
decisions on more complete information regarding potential environmental
harms, given that a proposed project would be able to draw on the expertise and
policy judgment of state environmental regulators. The conventional approach
of seeking FERC certificate approval prior to state environmental permitting
allows state regulators to withhold their assessment of a project and to allow
evidence of environmental harms to be used to deny a permit, even if that
evidence was not vetted in the context of FERC's review. FERC certainly has
not made the situation any better in its certificate approval decisions, many of
which assert general preemption of state and local laws in a sweeping manner,
rather than speaking specifically to which state and local laws are preempted
and why.29 1Moreover, the current process invites state environmental regulators
to make routing determinations that conflict with federal pipeline certification
proceedings, leading to a possibility of litigation that can further delay final
29 2
resolution of pipeline project approval.
One objection to such procedural changes is that any complete environmental review of a pipeline project depends, first and foremost, on an evaluation of the pipeline's environmental impacts given a specific location, and the
routing of a project may change pending the outcome of FERC's pipeline certification proceedings. But there are serious risks to any federal pipeline certification process that artificially separates decisions regarding the location of a
pipeline from an assessment of its environmental impacts. As one Minnesota
appellate court has recognized in another context, any regulator's decision about
the location of a project only benefits from a more complete approach to environmental review. 291 This underscores the significance of addressing any envi-

290. See supra Part II.C.
291. See Russell Kooistra, Note, How FERC Confuses the Role of State and Local Authorities in
Regulating Certified Natural Gas Pipelines, J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 59, 59-60 (Winter
2015).
292. For example, Constitution Pipeline has filed challenges to New York's denial of its water
permits in federal court, alleging that New York regulators based their rejection of Constitution's permits on considerations that extend beyond "water quality" under the CWA and that
are preempted by FERC's authority to approve a pipeline certificate under section 7 of the
Natural Gas Act. See, e.g., Constitution Pipeline Co. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, No. 16-1568 (2d Cir. May 16, 2016); see also Hunton & Williams, Constitution Pipeline
Cases Reflect Tension in States' Roles in PermittingNatural Gas Projects, PIPELINELAW.COM
(Aug. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/J65H-PR9P.
293. In re N.D. Pipeline Co., 869 N.W.2d 693 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that a state
agency certificate of need determination regarding oil pipeline project routing prior to environmental review violates the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act).
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ronmental review concerns early in the assessment of a pipeline project, rather
than only after a project's location has been determined. 29 4
Congress has required FERC to coordinate a consolidated record for judicial review of pipeline certification proceedings, which includes the decisions of
all federal and state agencies acting under federal law.29 5 This includes state
regulators' decisions regarding environmental permits, to the extent that they
are issued under authority delegated by Congress under the CWA's cooperative
federalism program. 296 It seems odd for Congress to require a federal agency to
maintain a record, but not to envision that agency will also base any final federal decision on information in that record. Of course, state environmental regulators must continue to exercise their statutory role in assessing the
environmental harms associated with the routing of such projects. Under the
CAA, the Coastal Zone Management Act, and the CWA, states should always
have an opportunity to independently evaluate environmental impacts. 297 In
projects that span multiple states, FERC's initial review of a certificate application could benefit substantially from knowing the positions of various state regulators on pipeline routing-especially where states differ on the assessment of
environmental harms. And where there is a potential for disagreement between
FERC and state regulators (if perhaps a state water or air permit has been
denied, on grounds that FERC might question), FERC could seek EPA's input before accepting a certificate application, inviting broader national expertise
in assessing environmental harms and ensuring that the ultimate siting determination is attentive to broader environmental goals. All of these kinds of reforms should not only create benefits by making the agency's procedures more
efficient, but also they should enhance the likelihood that FERC's pipeline permitting determinations will be upheld by courts on review.

294. As is illustrated in FERC's flowchart regarding the process for pipeline approval, state environmental permitting is considered an afterthought, only triggered after FERC approves a
project under section 7 of the Natural Gas Act. See Pre-FilingEnvironmentalReview Process,
FERC, https://perma.cc/3QUN-5S3K (identifying opportunities for stakeholder input, but
mentioning no specific role for state regulators other than environmental review if a project
is approved by FERC).
295. This was added by section 313 of EPAct 2005. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
FERC implemented this mandate with Order 665. See Regulations Implementing Energy
Policy Act of 2005; Pre-Filing Procedures for Review of LNG Terminals and Other Natural
Gas Facilities, 113 FERC ¶ 61,015 (Oct. 7, 2007) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 153, 157, 375,
385), http://perma.cc/V237-RARG.
296. See Regulations Implementing Energy Policy Act of 2005, 113 FERC ¶ 61,015 at 48.
297. See supra Part II.A.
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CollaborativeBenefits of FERC and Project Sponsors Better Engaging State
Interests in Infrastructure Siting Decisions

*

Many scholars and policymakers have called for "hybrid" governance approaches to issues related to energy infrastructure. 29 8 We agree that these kinds
of approaches are desirable and have shown enormous promise in addressing
many interstate energy projects by making procedures more efficient and enhancing the likelihood that an agency's permitting decision will withstand judicial scrutiny. When it comes to project siting decisions-where state and local
governments have a strong interest in retaining control over land use-some of
the most ambitious proposals to overcome siting impasses have remained elusive. To take one example, in EPAct 2005, Congress explicitly provided for
interstate compacts as a way of overcoming siting impasses involving three or
more states. 29 9 So far none of these compacts have been formed, in large part
because states, facing pressure from both landowners and environmental
groups, have voiced reluctance to cede regulatory turf and authority to federal
regulators.3
This might seem unexpected, given that an interstate compact can help a
state to avert any increased federal intervention into electric power transmission
siting. Given that the federal government has no stick in transmission line siting, however, state interest groups are readily able to avoid both interstate compacts and federal encroachment into their siting decisions. The resulting
impasse arguably invites states, along with interest groups opposed to projects,
to focus on the exercise of veto points over projects. Similarly, a pipeline siting
process that only considers limited environmental concerns at the back end of
federal permitting approvals encourages state environmental regulators and environmental interest groups to take a wait-and-see approach, which maximizes
the impact of any potential veto point state regulators possess over a project.
A process that maximizes the influence of veto points may serve to maximize a state or interest group's ability to control the outcome of energy permitting, but this comes at considerable cost-regardless of whether one values an
298. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL.
L. REv. 1 (arguing for hybrid forms of energy governance); Klass, supra note 9 (arguing for
greater regional governance).
299. EPAct 2005 established advanced consent for interstate compacts between three or more
2
contiguous states. 16 U.S.C. § 8 4p(i) (2012). States that enter into such compacts are immune from backstop siting authority. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i)(4). But once the courts interpreted FERC's backstop siting authority narrowly, reducing any risk that it would be applied
to override state siting denials, the incentive for entering into interstate compacts was significantly reduced. See Klass, supra note 9, at 1946-48 (discussing EPAct 2005 provisions on
backstop siting authority and interstate compacts).
300. See Klass & Rossi, supra note 60, at 135 n.16 (discussing interstate compact authority for
approving transmission projects); see also Jim Malewitz, To Bolster Energy Grid, States Weigh
Compact, USA TODAY (July 26, 2013), https://perma.cc/JY5J-4RDT.
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expansion of energy infrastructure or environmental protection. It contributes
to highly inefficient decision-making. It also fails to produce comprehensive
information about the environmental and other impacts of energy projects early
enough to be considered in any meaningful way in key permitting decisions. As
the case studies presented in this Article show, there are demonstrated tools
that can reduce these kinds of federalism conflicts in interstate electricity and
gas infrastructure siting, without requiring either states or the federal government to cede authority. We believe that these tools are more likely to be
adopted than statutory reforms to federal jurisdiction because, unlike any concession of regulatory authority, they will also produce collaborative benefits for
states and private interest groups.
Both states and project proposers themselves could better facilitate interstate engagement regarding the siting of energy infrastructure if they were to
more proactively address the state and local impacts in evaluations of electric
transmission line projects and natural gas pipelines. Recognition by federal regulators and project proposers of the benefits and harms of particular energy
projects could help to encourage more collaboration between states in developing and evaluating information regarding the impacts of particular projects. For
example, if state regulators knew that federal regulators would review any assessment of a project's benefits, this would encourage states to back up these
claims with credible evidence. Likewise, if state environmental regulators were
aware that federal regulators were likely to evaluate their findings regarding
environmental and land use harms, this might encourage them to present better
evidence to federal regulators in the certificate and federal environmental review
processes, rather than sit back and wait to raise evidence supporting objections
to a project as a part of state environmental review following a certificate approval. 01 Greater emphasis on state concerns in the federal siting process may
also place additional pressures on project proposers to offer additional routing
and mitigation concessions early in the process to appease both federal regulators and state regulators because they know that failure to do so may hold up
the federal siting permit.
301. Although the process for FERC to approve hydroelectric plant licenses differs from both the
approval process for natural gas pipelines and electric transmission lines, laws enacted in the
context of hydropower licensing on collaboration among regulatory agencies are helpful in
the present context. A 1986 law required FERC to balance environmental interests with the
need to develop new sources of power in hydroelectric licensing, and to consult with other
agencies regarding the impacts of these decisions. See Electric Consumers Protection Act of
1986, Pub. L. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (amending Federal Power Act sections 4(e), 10(a), and
10(j)); Gina S. Warren, Hydropower: It's a Small World After All, 91 NEB. L. REv. 925,
933-38 (2013) (discussing 1986 amendments to Federal Power Act provisions governing
hydropower licensing). One study of FERC's hydroelectric relicensing process found that
when a greater number of federal agencies participate in the FERC proceeding, on average, a
greater number of conditions were placed on the license. See J.R. DeShazo &Jody Freeman,
Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 2217, 2265-67 (2005).
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Moreover, where an energy infrastructure project stands to benefit multiple states, state regulators might be more inclined to work with neighbors in
their region in developing good information about a project's benefits rather
than opt to assess benefits to a state on its own. This kind of collaborative
pooling in developing information about a project's benefits and harms seems
far superior to a framework where each state attempts to develop a record concerning the benefits and burdens of a project. This could only help in facilitating greater coordination between states, as states would have better leverage in
raising arguments before federal regulators where there is strength in numbers.
Moreover, if developers of projects knew that the benefits and harms to individual states would be taken seriously and compared by some regulators, they
would be more willing to reroute projects to areas with less significant environmental impacts or offer mitigation or other concessions to potential hold out
states. 3 02 Indeed, the recent example of Clean Line's effort to build in-state
support for the Grain Belt Express project through power contracts with municipal utilities after failing to obtain a state siting certificate raises the question
of whether Clean Line might have obtained a more favorable result from state
regulators in the first instance if it had made these efforts much earlier in the
process.3 03
As another example of how such changes can benefit both federal and
state regulation, consider FERC's Order 1000, which requires regional transmission planning entities and utilities to consider state public policy requirements.3 04 RTOs and utilities planning for new electric transmission can no
longer go it alone in assessing their transmission needs, but at the very least
must consider state requirements such as RPSs. The very existence of such an
expectation requires utilities to think more explicitly about how new transmission policies create different benefits across multiple states. Order 1000 also
assures states seeking to promote new policies that their initiatives will not be
shipwrecked by parochial power grid interests, thus encouraging states to continue to innovate in their clean energy policies. In reviewing transmission plans,
302. For example, in the context of DOE's approval of the Plains & Eastern project, Clean Line
also offered many mitigation measures and other concessions, though this was after state
regulators had considered and rejected the project. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIS0486, MITIGATION ACTION PLAN FOR THE PLAINS & EASTERN CLEAN LINE TRANsMIsSION PROJECT (2016), http://perma.cc/3KBB-C6FW (describing various measures to mitigate adverse environmental concerns adopted by Clean Line as a condition to DOE's
approval of the project despite Arkansas regulators' objections).
303. ETO, supra note 222, at 24 ("It remains to be seen whether the fact of a Missouri entity
signing an agreement that could be seen as demonstrating the public-interest value of the
project in Missouri will result in the Missouri PSC approving the project on its third attempt
in the state.").
304. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public
Utilities, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 (2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35), affd, S.C. Pub. Serv.
Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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FERC focuses on whether these various benefits have been considered by planning bodies-in order to ensure that benefits of new projects are not ignored or
dismissed in favor of an incumbent utility's projects. 05
In addressing transmission line siting, of course, FERC does not have explicit authority to preempt the land use decisions of state and local authorities.
Yet, much as with Order 1000, federal regulators might be able to promote
greater coordination in siting decisions by producing information regarding the
benefits of siting new projects and in encouraging project sponsors to negotiate
with holdout states if there were an expectation that federal regulators would be
evaluating the benefits of projects to particular states, as well as national or
regional benefits.
There are at least two primary counterarguments to this emphasis on the
benefits of improved federal-state coordination. The first is the concern some
scholars have voiced that contemporary efforts by federal agencies and the
White House to encourage states to play an active role in the federal regulatory
process and to promote federalism values has not actually accomplished those
goals. As Professor Miriam Seifter has detailed, many federal agencies: that solicit "state" input as a result of regulatory requirements or Executive Order
mandates obtain input from national groups representing state interests such as
the National Governors Association, the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, and the like.3 06 Since these
groups are well staffed and operate on a large scale, they seem particularly well
positioned to overcome barriers to individual state participation and encourage
consideration of federalism-based values in agency decision-making. However,
Professor Seifter also points out that the heavy reliance on these national interest groups serves to entrench a homogenous perspective on state interests, thus
undercutting some of the primary aims of administrative federalism. In particular, because of their commitment to protecting state regulatory authority and
their practice of speaking with a single voice, national interest groups representing state interests do not convey valuable expertise and information to federal
agencies about the various impacts on individual states. These trans-state interest groups that often participate in federal discussions are also "less transparent
305. Id.
306. See Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative State, 100 VA. L. REv. 953,
961-67 (2014). Executive Order 13,132, known as the 1999 Federalism Executive Order,
requires federal agencies to follow "fundamental federalism principles" to ensure that issues
that are not national in scope are addressed by the level of government "closest to the people," that the states should function as "laboratories of democracy," and that the federal
government should defer to the states when federal actions affect state policymaking discretion. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,255-56 (Aug. 4, 1999). The Order
also "endorses state interest groups as appropriate state representatives." Seifter, supra, at
971-72 (citing and quoting Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999)).
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and less accountable to state citizens" because of differing needs and views
among the states.3 07
Concerns like these certainly seem valid in situations where an agency is
evaluating general federal policies regarding the environment, health care, energy policy, or other substantive areas of the law that can significantly impact
each state's regulatory authority and policy in similar ways on a nationwide
basis. However, they seem less relevant to individual project siting decisions
where the project costs and benefits will generally fall on a select few states, and
produce conflicts between specific states concerning costs and benefits. In these
situations, national interest groups representing state interests seldom are involved and play a less significant role, because, as shown in the case of the
Clean Line projects and in many pipeline projects, some states favor these
projects and some states oppose them. Accordingly, there is little opportunity
for a national group representing state interests to speak with a single voice and
federal agencies are forced to consult with individual state agency representatives, who do represent their citizens (unlike state interest groups), to set the
appropriate balance between federal and state power and obtain expertise on the
project's impact on state resources and citizens. Thus, in the context of federal
siting decisions, improving federal-state coordination can improve decisionmaking and advance federalism values in many cases.
A second counterargument is the reality that in many cases, states oppose
projects not because of specific environmental and land use concerns that can be
addressed through rerouting or other mitigation, but because landowners, local
governments, interest groups, or the state itself is simply opposed to the project
in any way, shape, or form. Indeed, this may be the case with regard to the
Constitution Pipeline if in fact the primary driver behind New York's denial of
section 401 water quality certification is opposition to fossil fuel infrastructure
projects in general, rather than this particular pipeline route and associated local
impacts in particular. This is true in many cases, and such disputes cannot easily
be resolved by better federal-state coordination. Still, looking to electric transmission as an example, Clean Line's continued negotiations with Missouri utilities for the Grain Belt Express project and the example of the Great Northern
Transmission Line suggest that in at least some cases, early efforts by project
proponents to negotiate and mitigate adverse impacts can work to reduce state
and local opposition to projects. This holds true whether the state is the primary siting authority (as in the case of electric transmission lines) or a potential
veto point over federal siting authority (as in the case of interstate natural gas
pipelines). Similarly, early efforts by environmental interest groups and state
agencies to generate and vet information regarding environmental and land use
impacts can help to memorialize any concerns they have. If this were considered a part of the record of any federal project permit, these interest groups
307. Seifter, supra note 306, at 979.
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would see more benefit to participating at the front-end of federal energy approval proceedings rather than the conventionally preferred wait-and-see approach to presenting adverse environmental impacts.
We thus believe that modest procedural reforms to the federal siting process can serve to encourage involvement by project developers and interest
groups at earlier stages of regulatory proceedings, helping to promote and vet
information regarding state and local impacts associated with projects. By diffusing the most counterproductive state and interest group behaviors, including
those that might discourage early concessions by energy project developers, or
invite the strategic delay in presenting information of negative project impacts
to federal regulators, this will not only benefit federal permitting decisions; it
can also help to improve the quality of state environmental regulation.
CONCLUSION

This Article has explored the growing federalism tensions over the infrastructure required to transport natural gas and electricity throughout the United
States. For many decades, a strict federalism divide granted the federal government primary authority over interstate natural gas pipeline siting and eminent
domain, while allowing states primary authority over interstate electric transmission line siting and eminent domain. Because of rapid changes in the
amount and location of U.S. energy resources, coupled with growing concerns
over the use of fossil fuels and the infrastructure required to transport it to
markets, we argue that consistent focus on changes to respective federal and
state authority in this divide is failing to meet the nation's energy and environmental protection needs. Rather, more modest procedural reforms can create a
new system that more appropriately balances the federal, state, and local interests in this area.
We believe that recent federal innovation in energy permitting decisions
demonstrates how these procedural reforms can produce significant benefits.
Important lessons can be drawn from the DOE's recent decision to approve the
Plains & Eastern Clean Line project under EPAct 2005, as well as the New
York environmental regulator's decision to reject CWA certification for the
Constitution Pipeline. These case studies illustrate how, in both the interstate
electric transmission line and interstate natural gas pipeline realms, there is
considerable room for federal agencies and project proposers to proactively engage a wider range of stakeholders in the approval process, including state environmental regulators, in ways that can improve the quality of the decisionmaking process and avoid protracted, after-the-fact litigation.
There is no doubt that the hydraulic fracturing boom of the past decade
and rapid growth of utility-scale renewable energy has placed growing pressures
on the nation's energy transport infrastructure. By bearing the brunt of many of
these pressures, regulatory regimes governing energy transportation often seem
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to reinforce jurisdictional lines reflecting a bias in favor of either state authority,
as in electric power, or federal authority, as in gas pipelines. But these added
pressures also provide a valuable opportunity for energy regulators to step beyond entrenched jurisdictional battle lines. Modest agency-led procedural reforms can help reconstitute energy permitting struggles towards improved
federal-state dialogue and better quality energy permitting decisions, and away
from protracted legal wrangling over federal versus state jurisdiction. The procedural reforms we propose can improve agency decisions, increase the likelihood of their acceptance by courts, and, perhaps most importantly, diffuse the
most obstructionist interest group behaviors that plague the decision-making
process surrounding many important energy projects.

